Archive for the ‘startups’ Category

Dumb start-up ideas

Wednesday, March 24th, 2010

Y-Combinator announced their new start-ups. Some of these ideas sound really tired, or very small scale and not worth trying:

LaunchHear
Founders: Alex Krupp, Allan Young
LaunchHear is a platform for introducing new & unreleased products to digital influencers. We reduce the cost of sending free products to bloggers and tweeters by 10x. We also host Swagapalooza, the first invitation-only event for only the most-followed bloggers and tweeters from across the country.

That sounds really boring.

NewsLabs
Founders: Paul Biggar, Nathan Chong
NewsLabs turns an experienced offline journalist into VentureBeat or TechCrunch for their niche. We provide tools, traffic, monetization and community to allow journalists to succeed as personal brands online, while allowing them to focus on the writing and reporting.

News is dead. People need to stop trying to save it. Anyway, what are they offering other than a blog? Blogging was cutting edge in 2001.

Seeing Interactive
Founders: Lloyd Armbrust, Jason Novek
A white-label Yelp for newspapers: Think Yellow Pages + Cars + Homes + Craigslist all launched as one package for small US markets. We work through local newspapers, TV or Radio stations to brand the product as their own and make money through monthly fees and upsells.

News is dead. People need to stop trying to save it.

Zencoder
Founders: Jon Dahl, Brandon Arbini, Steve Heffernan
Cloud services for video encoding, delivery, and monetization (AWS for video)

Good luck. The video market gets a lot of VC money, and other than YouTube, it is hard to see a big winner.

Nowmov
Founders: Thomas Pun, James Black, David Kelso
Nowmov shows you the hottest videos on Twitter RIGHT NOW. We discover the most talked about videos well before our competitors do (YouTube, Redux and Bitly.tv). Our user experience intentionally mimics TV watching — discovery is passive, rather than requiring the user to click around. Videos are presented continuously in an elegant user interface. Users can skip and replay clips at any time just like surfing TV channels.

Seriously?

Caterina Fake on the New York startup scene

Sunday, March 7th, 2010

Caterina Fake on the New York startup scene

Matt Mireles advances the classic arguments for why NYC is not a good place for a startup in his piece for Business Insider — raising money is hard, and talent is scarce — but I’d like to make a couple of points to the contrary

Read the whole thing.

What is the point of diversity?

Tuesday, February 23rd, 2010

This is pretty funny, except, sadly, it is wrong:

Strictly speaking the complaint was phrased in terms of “diversity”. This is the peculiar diversity of the American academy, where a gay Jewish man in New York, an Englishman in London, a 4th generation zainichi kankokujin (ethnically Korean who was born in Japan), and an Irish Catholic dogmatist living in a rice field in Central Japan are so close they are practically brothers. True diversity, of course, is the 5-member iStockPhoto of attractive twenty-somethings sitting on the college quad who check different boxes on the demographic inventory and think alike in every way that matters.

That is a good joke about how diversity is often defined in the US, but my friends in the Academy are generally showing more nuance, especially these last 4 or 5 years. The true stereotype being attacked here is the one formulated mostly by marketing departments at corporations across the land. The iStockPhoto described sounds like something out of the Apple marketing division, no doubt used to promote iPhones.

This is a good question:

If demographic diversity is a proxy for diversity of thought, is there some reason we’re not measuring diversity of thought? Is it hard to measure somehow?

Yes, it is hard to measure, especially if you want to measure diversity of good ideas. It is impossible to measure diversity of good ideas when you are hiring, because only the passage of time will reveal if an idea was good or not. Starting with a diversity of staff is form of buying insurance – get diverse staff and hopefully you will get a diversity of thought.

Short term anecdotal evidence is bad:

I mean, I would be sympathetic to “We can’t build products for women if we don’t have more women in the room” if it weren’t so laughably false. (Context if you need it: 90% of my customers are ladies. They’re also older, better educated, less coastal, and more religious than would be anticipated of the customer base of most B2C startups. I’m pretty much your typical 27 year old male engineer… well, for certain quirky values of “typical”.)

Diversity of thought is useful in the same way diversity of genetic traits is useful – it is at its most useful in a crisis, when you face an inflection point. Therefore, it plays out mostly over the long term. You need 15 years of data before anecdotal data begins to carry weight. You need to survive a crisis.

My beef with the discourse of “diversity” in a nutshell: it screams “give us more women” and whispers “give us more women like us”. We want more women to be early stage startup employees working for equity and battling code until 2 AM in the morning.

Not sure who the word “us” refers to. I’ve read arguments that career trajectories should be reshaped to allow parents to both work and spend time with their family. But, to me, the question of “Why are there no women in tech” is less interesting than “Why are there less women in tech than 20 years ago?” One can’t argue “It’s biological” when one is comparing one group of women to another.

But my gut instinct has always been that people avoid joining startups because joining startups sucks. The question isn’t what are we doing that’s keeping ladies out of the Valley, gentlemen. The question should be why in God’s name are we still here.

A common rhetorical technique – Phillip Greenspun tried the same thing here. Also, pointless. As long as men are willing to do startups, it remains a valid issue to ask why are there so few women.

Your sales pitch as a startup is “Turn your back on all that! We’ll work you 100 hours a week, pay you nothing while requring you to live in a freakishly expensive area, give you social status one rung above the homeless, take two to three years of your life, ruin your relationships, and with better than 90% probability subject you to the most crushing defeat of your professional career with no lateral move except into doing the same thing over again.”

Maybe there is something in this. The bit about “100 hours” is nonsense – I’ve got 3 female friends who became doctors, all of them had to work an endless stretch of 70 to 90 hour weeks. Women are not afraid of working extremely long hours. Possibly the extreme riskiness of startups plays some role, though I’d be curious how that risk interacts with gender. My friends who became doctors at least knew that if they could make it through then the rest of their future would be relatively assured.

If we fix this, it will result in more ladies at the margin seeing startups as an attractive career choice. It might not change the percentages in the Valley. Heck, it might even make it more skewed towards the guys. I don’t profess to know and, honestly, I don’t really care that much either — it is worth doing regardless for the benefits to human welfare.

True, most of the advice is good in terms of human welfare. I suspect most of it is wholly irrelevant to gender issues.

Does Stack Overflow need VC money?

Monday, February 15th, 2010

37 Signals says that Stack Overflow doesn’t need VC money:

1. The Answers market is in a land grab mode

Unlike eBay, where there’s a general market for goods and you get huge network effects from having a critical mass of buyers and sellers, StackOverflow is all about niches. People who are searching for “how to make sql server not go slow?” aren’t likely to bleed over to “how to make swedish meatballs?”.

This means that you’ll have to fight for every niche. Similar to how general forums would have to fight for every niche. Just because you have a forum site that’s big for gamers, you won’t have much of an edge attracting foodies.

Finally, it’s not like this is a new idea with no other entrants. Look at Yahoo Answers for a site that’s still up with a similar model and look at Google Answers for another that couldn’t be turned into a worthwhile business and closed.

Land grab mode? I worry that we lack the resources we need to expand WP Questions. The next year will be exciting – who knows how this race will play out?

More on the New York startup scene

Monday, January 25th, 2010

I wrote recently about the New York tech scene.. Now Caterina Fake offers her thoughts on what New York is missing:

But what NYC is actually missing is not engineers. In NYC you can find lots of great engineers, visual designers, and great publishers and contributors to social media. But in CA I seem to find far more people with multiple skills – engineers who blog and dabble in design, designers who can do great UI but also great UX, etc. These multidisciplinary people are the ones who hack together brilliant new stuff, can innovate across the board, see various avenues of attack, and are indispensable at startups. It is these hybrid people that we are always looking for at Hunch and for whatever reason find them much more often in CA than NYC.

New York has come of age as a start-up hub

Saturday, January 23rd, 2010

Obviously I’m biased, since I’m trying to do a start-up in New York, but everything about this rings true:

Tumblr and Posterous are the two most prominent “tumblogging” sites, i.e. sites that make blogging more straightforward by making it easier to post media. Both were launched within six months. (Actually, Posterous was started later than Tumblr.)

But now Tumblr has been an Alexa Top 100 site for a while and is still growing strong. Meanwhile Posterous has about 4 times less uniques. Yet Posterous has everything to win: it’s a Y Combinator company with top-tier investors like Chris Sacca and Mitch Kapor. Its founders are experienced software engineers with computer science degrees from Stanford. How come it’s eating dust from a small startup started by a high school dropout?

The answer is as easy as it is counter-intuitive: Tumblr is a New York company and Posterous is a Silicon Valley company.

Or, to put it another way: Posterous is an engineered product, while Tumblr is a designed product.

Posterous is extremely well engineered. There’s nothing wrong with it. Every single thing about it is well thought out. But it’s not just that it’s less pretty (though it is). It’s just not designed as well as Tumblr is.

…In fact, everything about Posterous is nice. It’s very nice. I’m not here to bash Posterous, I think it’s a tremendous product and I wish them the best of luck.

But everything about Tumblr is better designed. I used the landing page as one example, but there are tons of features where Tumblr shines by its gorgeous design.

Meanwhile Posterous is typical of the Silicon Valley engineering mindset where everything is measured, ranked, weighted. It’s like Google. And having terrible design like Google is great if you have a technology edge. But if you’re in a market where what matters is design edge, that’s not enough. There needs to be great design, by which I don’t mean looks (though they’re important), but how it works for the end user.

…The first is that New York has truly come of age as a startup hub, with its own “style”, its own way of doing things, its own mindset, which can sometimes — not always, but sometimes — kick Silicon Valley’s ass.

What does it take to be an entrepreneur?

Friday, January 15th, 2010

Daniel Chu on what it takes to be entrepreneur:

Without commitment, you will not start your own business. Many “experts” advise people to start something small on the side while keeping their day job. I personally think this is not going to fly because why would you spend the time to think about other people’s business during the day when you can actually use the time to think about your own? If you can, then you are probably not that serious about your business.

…Or let’s say if you only have one hour to spend with your own kid versus somebody else’s kid, whose kid are you going to spend the time with?

If you cannot find that personal, emotional connection with your own business, just forget it since you will be able to use those few extra hours to work for a job and get a promotion sooner.

Hence, first step — commitment, and that is — quit your job immediately.

This is my own attitude as well. I strongly disagree with the approach taken by 37 Signals in such posts as “How many hours should I work per week?“:

Investment bankers may work 18 hour days…but look at the state of the investment banking business. It’s not the quantity of hours you work, it’s how you spend the hours you do work and what you’re working on that matter.

Too many people think they have to work 80-100 hour weeks. They think, “No amount of work is too much work.” They pull all-nighters or sleep at the office.

But you don’t have to work superhuman hours. A normal workweek should be plenty. Even less is ok. In fact, being short on time is a good thing. It forces you to focus on the essentials. There’s no time for things that don’t matter. There’s only time for the basics. And if you want to build something great, you have to nail the basics first.

Basecamp, our flagship product, was created on the side while we were still doing client work. With just 10 hours a week of programming time and 10 hours a week of design time, we made a product that took off.

They repeated the point in “It doesn’t have to be all or nothing with a startup“:

Startup mythology demands that to create something great, you need superhuman sacrifices. You need to work for no pay, you need to put in 120 hours/week, you need to preferably sleep under the desk and live off pizza as a sole form of nutrient. As a result, you need to abandon your family and risk life without insurance.

Hogwash!

We’ve repeated this story so many times that it’s starting to wear a little thin, but here it goes again: Basecamp was created with 10 hours/week of programming time and as a 3rd or 4th project alongside paying customers for the designers over the course of about 6 months. In other words, we didn’t drop everything we had to create Basecamp, and you don’t have to either.

There are plenty of startup ideas that can be done without millions in funding, thousands of man hours, and dramatic risk. But I can excuse people from failing to see them when blinded by press and popular opinion. Everywhere you turn it’s stories about how ever-younger entrepreneurs with nothing to lose are defying all odds and making mortal sacrifices to reach their impossibly unlikely goals and succeeding.

Did I say hogwash already?

Possibly this works for 37 Signals, though I am suspicious. There is a wealth of research suggesting that time on task increases learning and productivity. However, it is true that “time on task” is not meaningful in itself, but rather, “time on completed tasks” is crucial:

But meaningful time on task is a misnomer because it is not exactly about time; learning in schools is about completing tasks that directly relate to the goals of instruction. These lesson tasks tend to be either open-ended, such as developing critical thinking skills or improving composition skills or alternatively are tightly focused, such as covering content on a high stakes state-wide test. For example, a recent evaluation conducted in seven schools in the Pemberton School District, reported a relationship between the number of CompassLearning lesson activities completed and performance on the New Jersey state-wide test. On average, students gained 1 scaled-score point for every 13.0 CompassLearning reading lessons and 1 scaled-score point for every 12.4 CompassLearning mathematics lessons completed. Whether the goal is broad in intent or tightly focused, stating the goal for online instruction and then completing lessons that address that goal are crucial.

For my part, I need a few hours to get into work mode. I’m often inefficient in my use of time, especially in the mornings. I make up for it by working more time – 10 or 12 hour days are normal for me. I suspect that someone at 37 Signals might suggest that I’m “not really working” for the whole of those 12 hours. I’m not, that is the whole point – I’m not working the whole of that 12 hours, but I am attempting to get into a work frame of mind for those 12 hours. Sometimes it takes me 12 hours to get 8 good hours of productive work. The folks at 37 Signals are missing an important psychological element – the danger of distraction, which becomes greater when one works less.

Their example of Basecamp, where they worked 10 hours a week, is especially pointless. What matters is how many hours a week people are focused on work, not how many hours a week they are focused on any particular project. How much of your time do you spend in work mode, thinking about work problems? Studies have shown that big breakthroughs tend to come after long, intense contemplation of a problem. Innovation requires time:

During the past few years I’ve noticed a curious paradox heading its ugly rear among business leaders tooting the horn for innovation.

On one hand they want the rank and file to step up to the plate and own the effort to innovate.

On the other hand, they are unwilling to grant the people they are exhorting any more TIME to innovate.

Somehow, magically, they expect aspiring innovators to not only generate game-changing ideas in their spare time, but do all the research, data collection, business case building, piloting, project management, idea development, testing, report generation, and troubleshooting in between their other assignments.

Tooth fairy alert!

This is not the way it happens, folks! Not only is this approach unreasonable, it’s unfair, unbalanced, and unworkable…

You cannot shoehorn game-changing innovation projects into the already overcommitted schedules of your overworked workforce.

If you do, it won’t be innovation you’ll get, only half-finished projects and a whole lot of cranky people complaining to you in between meetings.

Aspiring innovators don’t need pep talks. They need TIME. Time to think. And time to dream. Time to collaborate. And time to plan. Time to pilot. And time to test. Time to tinker. And time to tinker again.

That’s why Google and 3M give its workforce 20% of their time to work on projects not immediately connected to its core business. That’s why W.L. Gore gives its workforce a half day a week to follow their fascinations. That’s why Corel instituted it’s virtual garage program.

…The fear? If you give people “freedom” they’ll end up playing video games and taking 3-hour lunches. Alas, when fear takes over, folks, (the same fear Peter Drucker asked us all many years ago to remove from the workplace), vision is supplanted by supervision and all his micromanaging cousins.

Time to innovate is not time wasted. It is time invested.

The great business guru, Peter Drucker, says innovation arises from focused, disciplined work:

Most successful innovations, according to Drucker, come from a conscious, purposeful search for innovation opportunities. He saw four areas of opportunity inside organizations: unexpected occurrences, incongruities, process needs, and industry and market changes. Opportunities also exist outside organizations in its social and intellectual environments: demographic changes, changes in perception, and new knowledge. Together these seven account for almost all opportunities for innovation.

Effective innovation is simple and focused. If it tries to do too many things, people will get confused and implementation will be compromised. He also states that innovation is hard, focused, purposeful work. It requires knowledge and focus, and often, requires ingenuity. The foundation of entrepreneurship is the practice of systematic innovation.

Time on task explains why it is productive to work 90 hours a week, while taking lots of work breaks:

Working 90 hours a work week requires frequent, and highly effective, work breaks. In the center of Macintosh work area in Bandley 3 we had a ping pong table, a nice stereo system, and a Defender video game machine. We found that competitive play gave us a jolt of adrenaline, and a refreshed mind-set when we resumed work. We also learned a lot about our coworkers and how they excel during competition. While playing Defender one day I got some great insight into how Burrell accelerates his own learning process.

There is a huge difference between playing video games at work, versus playing them at home. At work, you know that you are going back to work, so your mind stays in work-mode. When you are done playing videos, your brain is both focused on the problems at hand, and also refreshed and ready to look at things anew. At home, when you play video games, your brain drifts to other forms of recreation, as you know you won’t be working for the rest of the day.

I’ve had friends who have sometimes suggested to me “Maybe you’ll be more productive if you work less.” I’ve tried it, it does not work for me. The less I work, the more distracted I am.

37 Signals seems relatively isolated on this issue. Most of the people who’ve written on this issue have suggested that time on task has a positive relationship with productivity.

Humility is the most important attribute a startup can have

Tuesday, January 12th, 2010

I think humility is the most important attribute a startup can have.

I think that Paul Buchheit sums it up best that the core of this “Release early. Release often. And listen to your customers” approach is humility.

So what’s the right attitude? Humility. It doesn’t matter how smart and successful and qualified you are, you simply don’t know what you’re doing. The good news is that nobody else does either, though some are foolish enough to think that they do (and
that’s why you can beat them).

What is the humble approach to product design? Pay attention. Notice which things are working and which aren’t. Experiment and iterate. Question your assumptions. Remember that you are wrong about a lot of things. Watch for the signals. Lose your technical and design snobbery. Whatever works, works.

Stay humble. If you think you are releasing early and often, and listening to your customers – ask yourself how you are doing compared to how gmail was built. If you think the gmail approach was too aggressive, ask yourself how many users you have relative to gmail.

The WageMachine offers competition to WP Questions

Tuesday, January 5th, 2010

Yesterday, the WageMachine opened its doors to the public. I see it as offering competition to WP Questions, or rather, where we expect to go with WP Questions over the next month or 2. The WageMachine has decided to start with a broad range of languages, rather than take the niche approach that we are taking:

We’re now slowly opening WageMachine to beta users. WageMachine lets you hire great programming tutors at minimum wage($8.55 per hour).

Learn or get help with what you’re struggling with in:

- Linux
- Ruby
- PHP
- Python
- Javascript
- C
- C#
- Erlang

We’ve got a healthy set of skills represented.

There is no catch–these are smart people who like to teach and are happy to do it for minimum wage.

There are some limitations. You do have to pay using PayPal up front, and can only hire someone for 30 minute – 1 hour shifts. (These are people who can make much more than minimum wage but are willing to work a bit because it’s convenient, they like the work, and it’s fun to get paid with PayPal right away).

We’ve got a handful of workers now who you can hire.

WageMachine is a side experiment, and we have no idea if this will work or not. But it should be a fun learning experience.

EDIT: Thanks to the great feedback from HackerNews users, we’ve tweaked a few things.

We’ve reduced the max shift to 1 hour from 2. This means you can hire people for either 30 minutes or 1 hour.

People pointed out that if you make $100 an hour, it makes more sense to spend 1 hour working and 10 hours looking for a job than to earn $8.55 per hour for 11 hours.

What we’re trying to stress is that this is more of an “intro” tool.

We think it makes more sense to do small <1 hr jobs for 10 people.
That's 10 new potential future clients. and it's $40-$80 bucks in your pocket. And you helped 10 people. Basically, we're turning time spent job hunting into more productive time spent.

Darren Hoyt and I are starting off focused on the tiny niche of WordPress. If WP Questions works out, we plan to expand, one niche at a time, to the markets that WageMachine is targeting:

- Linux
- Ruby
- PHP
- Python
- Javascript
- C
- C#
- Erlang

The history of the WageMachine is something that I can relate to:

The obvious solution was to take the BART (the Subway for you non-San Francisco folks).

However, I had been working at our startup without pay for the last 3 months. I had literally 6 cents in my bank account. I could not afford a BART ticket.

Plenty of time, but no money to get home.

It just so happened that earlier in the month I had read about a sculpture the artist Blake Fall-Conroy had created called the “Minimum Wage Machine”. As a person cranks a handle on the machine, it slowly releases a penny every 5.04 seconds. That’s about 12 pennies a minute, or $7.55 per hour.

While I was watching the rain fall, I literally thought “I wish I had a minimum wage machine right about now”–I would have gladly cranked a handle for 20 minutes to earn the subway fare home.

Then I thought, “why doesn’t this exist?” Why do I have to choose between doing challenging programming work for $50-100 per hour or earning $0 per hour?

Thus, I whipped out the laptop and got to work.

I’ve often thought about that too. I’ve had stretches of $100 an hour work followed by stretches of almost no work coming in, and I’ve been left wondering, why isn’t there more in the middle? And why can’t my own wage vary up and down casually, depending on circumstances, including such trivial circumstances as:

Am I at a friends house, waiting on a friend?

Am I bored and trying to kill time?

At such times I often go on to forums and answer people’s questions. Such work isn’t worth $100 an hour but it is worth something. So why aren’t there more places where I could pick up some money for answering such questions?

This line of reasoning is what lead to WP Questions, and it is also, apparently, what lead to the WageMachine.

Startups need to start getting feedback as fast as possible

Tuesday, January 5th, 2010

Relevant to Daniel Chu’s question “Will you share your venture idea with others?” , Breck Yunits suggests that a startup needs to go live as fast as possible so as to to escape the bubble:

What is “the bubble”?

The bubble is the early, early product development stage. When new people aren’t constantly using and falling in love with your product, you’re in the bubble. You want to get out of here as fast as possible.

If you haven’t launched, you’re probably in the bubble. If you’re in “stealth mode”, you’re probably in the bubble. If you’re not “launching early and often”, you’re probably in the bubble. If you’re not regularly talking to users/customers, you’re probably in the bubble. If there’s not a steady uptick in the number of users in love with your product, you’re probably in the bubble.

Why you secretly want to stay in the bubble

A part of you always wants to stay in the bubble because leaving is scary. Launching a product and having it flop hurts. You hesitate for the same reason you hesitate before jumping into a pool in New England: sure, sometimes they’re heated, but most of the time they’re frickin freezing. If the reception to your product is cold, if no one falls in love with it, it’s going to hurt.

With startups, it is the execution that matters, not the idea

Tuesday, January 5th, 2010

Daniel Chu asks “Will you share your venture idea with others?” He then lists the pros and cons:

Benefits:

* You will get lots of feedback, mostly in the form of disbelief or rejection. However, that’s what you need to shape your business, and that’s what every business gets on a daily basis.

* You can practice your pitch before you do it in front of VCs.

* You may unintentionally find your partners / board of directors.

Risks:

* You will get discouraged and eventually give up on the idea.

* Others will steal your idea and implement it before you.

* Your competitor will find a way to destroy you before you are ready to launch.

I posted the following as a comment over there.

“Others will steal your idea and implement it before you.”

My sense is that the risk of this is typically exaggerated. I know you know this, so my comments here are not directed at you, but allow me to expand on this thought, perhaps to start a conversation.

Startups tend to be experiments – how can anyone steal the result of an experiment before the final results are known? Suppose, early in 1928, Sir Alexander Fleming told someone “I’m looking at the lifecycle of staphylococci”. Could someone then see the potential for killing staphylococci? That would be quite a jump. The big discovery happened by accident, but in an environment where Fleming and his assistants were looking for something new. It’s worth noting that at least 3 other researchers, starting 30 years earlier, in the 1890s, had already noted the negative effects that some mold could have on the growth of bacteria. And yet those previous researchers never realized the potential of what they were looking at. Assuming we all want to be the equivalent of Fleming (that is, we all want to be the ones to come up with the world-changing discovery) then we need to think about what he had that the previous researchers did not. For one thing, he had an openness to accidents. For another, he had a great crew and/or circle of former assistants – Merlin Price gave him important feedback at a crucial time.

Fleming did not know that penicillin existed until he found it. So he wasn’t looking for it. But when he accidentally stumbled across it, he had the insight to realize its importance.

A lot of big breakthroughs arise by accident while people are pursuing something else. An excellent current example would be Twitter. Roll the clock back to 2005 – Odeo launches their service for podcasting. The service does not take off. They are frustrated. They ask themselves, “How can we popularize these podcasts?” They start thinking about a messaging service, something lighter and easier than blogging. They talk to some folks who’ve been thinking about the potential of cell phones. They start a service. It soon becomes much bigger than Odeo. They are smart enough to realize the potential of what they’ve got.

What idea could you steal from either of these folks, before the moment that they realized the potential of what they had? The “lifecycle of staphylococci”? Who cares? It is a boring subject. Podcasting? Who cares? Lots of people tried podcasting startups, none of them made any serious money.

Until those folks realized the importance of what they had, there was nothing interesting to steal, and after they realized the importance of what they had, they had the advantage of being way ahead of everyone else.

I think all any startup can really aim for is be like Fleming’s lab in 1928 – go looking in an area that should have some potential, keep an open mind about what you’ll find, surround yourself with excellent people like Merlin Price, and be ready to change direction when you discover something unexpected and yet amazing.

I wrote that comment last night. I may have been guilty of underestimating the risks of someone stealing your idea. However, startups are mostly about execution. Most of the time, when you hear an entrepreneur claiming that others stole their idea, all it means is that that entrepreneur had terrible execution. It is important that we avoid becoming John Pratt:

I cannot tell you how painful it is to watch 5 assholes take your idea and run with it and not even give you credit. I hate all 5 of them for that. If I see them, I may punch each one of them in the face.

Can anyone read that and avoid the conclusion that Pratt is a terrible entrepreneur? Rage, accusations and self-pity, all condensed into a short online rant, and then followed up, in the comments, with insults aimed at everyone who read his rant? I read those words and conclude the man lacked the emotional stability to be a successful entrepreneur. Any risky venture will have its share of setbacks which must be born stoically – facing ruin an entrepreneur should aspire to the same calm resolve with which Robert Scott faced his death in Antarctica:

We took risks, we knew we took them; things have come out against us, and therefore we have no cause for complaint, but bow to the will of Providence, determined still to do our best to the last.

I should add, it is rare to have truly unique idea, especially in the area of the web. What I’ve seen, over the last 8 years, is this recurring pattern: the possibility of a new kind of site/service begins to emerge. The people I know realize it and become excited by it. We begin working on the software. 4 to 6 months later we are ready to launch. At exactly the same, several hundred other startups emerge, all with roughly the same idea. They, too, had the idea about the same time we did, and they too have spent the last 4 to 6 months working on their site/service.

I’ve seen this pattern recur with blogging software, RSS readers, podcasting, file storage, calendar software, online social networks, and video sales. Every year there was a new idea, and a race to be among the first to come out with that idea.

Rather than trying to avoid competition, one should expect it. You won’t be successful because of your uniquely creative idea, you will be successful (or not) because of your execution. And your energy should go toward executing well, rather than trying to keep your idea a secret. Again, I might draw a parallel with Robert Scott’s expedition to Antarctica. He and his team never expected to be in a race to be the first to the pole, but when they arrived in Antarctica they soon learned that a Norwegian team was nearby, also attempting to be first to the South Pole.

Scott received the news on 22 February, during the first depot-laying expedition. According to Cherry-Garrard, the first reaction of Scott and his party was to rush over to the Bay of Whales and have it out with Amundsen. However, Scott recorded the event calmly in his journal. “One thing only fixes itself in my mind. The proper, as well as the wiser, course is for us to proceed exactly as though this had not happened. To go forward and do our best for the honour of our country without fear or panic.”

To go forward and do your best, without fear or panic, is good advice for any startup.

The Arsdigita story

Saturday, January 2nd, 2010

I am surprised that I’ve never before linked to all of this stuff. This story has shaped my thinking on a lt of things. First of all, I learned SQL by reading Phillip Greenspun, back in 1999. And the way Arsdigita fell apart (and Greenspun’s and Michael Yoon’s and Eve Anderson’s various accounts, have played a huge role in how I think about a large range of issues, from funding, to startups, to ethics, to how different people try to manage the truth.

Michael Yoon’s account has always struck me as possibly being the closest to the truth, partly because he is the most self-critical.

So now I present an alternative perspective, the lessons that I learned from ArsDigita, both good and bad. This is not an apologia for the VCs who funded ArsDigita or for the post-VC management of ArsDigita, of which, for a time, I was a member. I recognize that the VCs and the management team (again, I include myself) made many mistakes and, at times, committed outright wrongdoing. My hope is to show you that there is much more to the story than what Eve wrote in her diary and that my truth is not as black and white as hers.

…Eve’s article reminded me, ironically, of the story of Adam and Eve. According to her, pre-VC ArsDigita was truly Edenic:

A company that was profitable from Day 1. A company that built products that were useful to many other companies. A company that had ethics, that treated the breadwinners (programmers) with respect, a company that could afford to help people and give away software and training, while still having enough left over to grow and save a few $million in the bank.

Then came the Fall:

… until the venture capitalists arrived on the scene. Lying to customers and employees became commonplace. Greed replaced philanthropy as each of the company’s unique programs was dropped. … The technical and managerial incompetence of the VCs and those they hired drove the company into the ground.

I read Milton in high school, so Eve’s thesis is clear enough to me: Venture capitalists = Satan.

But what exactly happened when the VCs “arrived on the scene”? Did they arrive in a Publishers Clearing House Sweepstakes van, ring the doorbell, hand us one of those enormous checks, and then trick us into signing it before we could read the fine print? Or did they break down the door, walk us down to the ATM at gunpoint, and demand that we deposit their $38,000,000? Facetiousness aside, my point is that the management of pre-VC ArsDigita (including Philip) signed the VCs’ term sheet of its own free will. (In the spirit of full disclosure, I should mention that I thought that taking the money was a good idea, mainly because I thought we were going to go public and get rich; had it been up to me, I probably would have made the same decision.)

Eve’s description of the transaction itself is impersonal: “In late March 2000, ArsDigita received $38 million in financing, primarily from General Atlantic Partners and Greylock, with a bit thrown in by Bain and Trident Capital as well.” ArsDigita is presented as a passive entity, not doing anything, just receiving, but that is misleading. We were not merely receiving; we were taking.

So why did we take? What was the Forbidden Fruit that tempted us to risk Eden? Here is Eve’s explanation of why we took the VC money: “A small group of developers earning lots of money, making clients happy, and developing and releasing a useful software product is wonderful, but … to make a substantial impact on the world, you gotta grow.” On the desire to make a substantial impact, I agree with Eve. I came to ArsDigita with a deep cynicism about the IT industry, and saw ArsDigita as an opportunity to show the world a better way. (When it appeared that we might make a lot of money in the process, that only made me happier.)

Of course, “making a substantial impact” is a rather vague goal, so I’m not even sure if my definition of “a substantial impact” coincides with Eve’s. My main objection, however, is to the implication that a blend of altruism (”making a substantial impact”) and manifest destiny (”you gotta grow”) was the reason that we took the VC money. In the open source world, there are many examples of software (notably, Linux and Apache) making a substantial impact on the world without the benefit of a large infusion of VC cash.

Philip’s explanation of why we took the money is more substantial than Eve’s. The first reason he presents is: “Companies don’t like to rely on enterprise software from small companies. There is too much risk that the vendor will go bankrupt. Open source ameliorates this risk to some extent but the tendency to stick to IBM, Microsoft, and Oracle is strong. We tried to present a face of financial invincibility to the world.” In other words, companies would refuse to buy from us unless we could appear to be “financially invincible,” an appearance that, presumably, we’d project by sitting atop a mountain of VC cash. Certainly, a 38 million dollar vote of confidence from top-tier VC funds is a boon when trying to persuade prospective customers of your staying power, but, just a few paragraphs earlier, Philip relates how “customers were knocking like crazy,” name-dropping Siemens as “a good example” of our clientele, brought to our door by the Boston Consulting Group. With one of the world’s largest corporations on our client list and one of the world’s most prestigious management consultancies as our partner, weren’t we already defying the conventional wisdom that said we had to have VC backing in order to land big customers?

Philip provides three more reasons for taking the capital:

We figured that we could use the extra money to place some bets on product development and marketing. Under the product development rubric we thought we’d not make the client teams carry the full weight of ACS development on their shoulders. If they found a client whose needs were similar to what we wanted in the product, we’d do the job for a low-ish price to get experience with that problem … and develop reusable code to enhance ACS. Under the marketing rubric we’d expand our “education marketing” program. Finally, we wanted working capital. A company with $20 million in revenue really needs to have about $10 million in the bank in case a customer doesn’t pay, the economy turns soft, an important project is late, etc. Because we’d been growing 1000 percent per year we never had more than a couple of million dollars in the bank.

These all seem reasonable enough, but were they, in addition to the Face of Financial Invincibility, really compelling enough — independent of any other consideration — to convince Philip, the majority owner and CEO, to sign that term sheet, to give up his complete control of the company? I don’t think so. I think Philip wants to have it both ways, maintaining that ArsDigita was so innovative and visionary that giants like Siemens came to us, while, at the same time, claiming that we needed VC dollars and the VC stamp of approval in order to survive in the market.

So what else was motivating Philip? My theory is impatience, a perfectly understandable emotion in those Gold Rush times. I felt it too. When I first joined ArsDigita, Philip used to ask me about Sapient, because he was interested in the fact that they had never taken outside investment and yet managed to make it big. The nutshell version of Sapient’s story is that they started as two guys in 1991 and slogged it out for years, growing organically, until they went public in 1996. In 1999, the notion of waiting five whole years to cash out was absurd. Philip stopped asking me about Sapient, presumably after he’d made up his mind to pursue the VC crapshoot.

Writing now with the benefit of hindsight, my point is not to say “I told you so” (because I didn’t). Rather, my point is that we pre-VC ArsDigitans, must also bear responsibility for what happened to the company.

Writing now with the benefit of hindsight, my point is not to say “I told you so” (because I didn’t). Rather, my point is that we pre-VC ArsDigitans, must also bear responsibility for what happened to the company.

Philip disagrees:

How could these three guys [Peter Bloom (General Atlantic), Chip Hazard (Greylock), and Allen Shaheen (CEO)] have achieved such dreadful results? For that it is worth looking at what kind of leadership is required for a software products company. First, you probably want someone who has previously founded and run a company or been CEO at a company founded by others (i.e., not someone who has been an employee his or her whole life). Second, you probably want someone who has previous experience as an executive in the software products business. Third, you probably want someone with domain knowledge. Fourth, you probably want someone with technical knowledge.

Whatever strengths Peter, Chip, and Allen may have, all three were 0 for 4 on the qualifications listed above.

So what does this say about Philip, that he so poorly qualified his own investors? It’s not as if Philip met Peter and Chip for the first time on the day after we got the money. Philip’s four qualifications are not subjective. From the sound of it, Philip should have been able to ask Peter and Chip four yes-or-no questions each and then rule them out on the spot. If nothing else, Philip is at least guilty of inadequate due diligence.

As for Eve, she concurs with Philip, saying: “Greylock and General Atlantic Partners have mis-managed ArsDigita into the ground.” She does not acknowledge that the pre-VC management made a single mistake, justifying even the decision to accept the VC money with the facile rationalization that “you gotta grow.” She appears to believe that it is 100% someone else’s fault that ArsDigita failed.

To me, this is a gross oversimplification, a symptom of deeply entrenched denial. ArsDigita was a good company, especially in the beginning, and I miss it, the way that it was back then, but I think it’s false to claim that ArsDigita was perfectly noble in its aspirations to grow, an innocent victim of the VCs’ ruthless predations. I also think it’s disingenuous to gloss over the fact that, at the end of the day (to borrow one of our second CEO’s favorite phrases), we took 38 million dollars of someone else’s money.

The truth I see is more complicated. How could it not be? After all, we were, and are, human beings, blessed and cursed with the full array of human traits: idealism, optimism, ambition, arrogance, naivete, jealousy, and, last but certainly not least, greed.

..There is at least one more lesson to be learned, from Eve herself, who writes:

Richard Buck was very impressed with my work and told multiple people that I could do as much work in one day as most people do in two weeks. Given what I’ve written about Richard Buck so far, one might be disinclined to lend much credence to his opinion of my work. But my performance reviews have concurred: dedicated, brilliant, super-efficient, “capable of doing anything she sets her mind to,” extremely high standards, a “tough but fair” manager. So I was certainly no slacker by anyone’s standards.

Eve appears to believe that Richard Buck is dishonest about everything except his high opinion of her. Similarly, she presents snippets from performance reviews as evidence of her own excellence. This excerpt illustrates what I call Oblivious Sacred Cow Syndrome. Whether you like it or not, whether it’s fair or not, if you are a co-founder/team leader/VP/girlfriend of the chairman/etc., you are a Sacred Cow, and people will blow smoke up your ass. I know this from firsthand experience, because I too was a team leader, and I saw people hesitate to be honest with me, for fear of causing offense.

My fellow team leader DVR felt no such compunction when he wrote, in a peer performance review, that I was too concerned about making people happy and that, while he had never seen me offend anyone, he had never seen me inspire anyone either. (He also complained that I didn’t work enough hours, but that’s another topic altogether.) While this criticism stings, as do the criticisms of ACS 4 that I discussed above, I value the fact that they aren’t blunted by Sacred Cow deference, that they are honest, and I have tried to learn from them.

In many ways, the worst thing about being an Oblivious Sacred Cow is that you miss the opportunity to learn from your own mistakes, since no one is willing to tell you when you make one. Of course, if you actually believe your own hype (or appear to), that only alienates you further. I saw this happen to Eve at ArsDigita: While members of Eve’s team frequently complained about her lack of management skills, few, if any, felt comfortable addressing their issues with her directly; instead, many of them simply requested a transfer to a different team. Similarly, while everyone granted that Eve was prolific, people who had to use and/or maintain her code (for example, her ACS 3.x Ecommerce module) often derided it as ugly, full of kluges, etc. Of course, it’s not nice that all of these criticisms were made behind Eve’s back, and the excerpt above makes it clear that Eve is blissfully unaware of these alternate perspectives on her performance and abilities. She would, I expect, say that they are flatly untrue. However, whether or not these criticisms of Eve were completely fair or accurate, the real question is: Wouldn’t Eve herself have been better off if people had felt that they could approach her with their criticisms? At least then, she would have had the opportunity to refute some of the criticisms and learn from the rest.

In many ways, the worst thing about being an Oblivious Sacred Cow is that you miss the opportunity to learn from your own mistakes, since no one is willing to tell you when you make one. Of course, if you actually believe your own hype (or appear to), that only alienates you further. I saw this happen to Eve at ArsDigita: While members of Eve’s team frequently complained about her lack of management skills, few, if any, felt comfortable addressing their issues with her directly; instead, many of them simply requested a transfer to a different team. Similarly, while everyone granted that Eve was prolific, people who had to use and/or maintain her code (for example, her ACS 3.x Ecommerce module) often derided it as ugly, full of kluges, etc. Of course, it’s not nice that all of these criticisms were made behind Eve’s back, and the excerpt above makes it clear that Eve is blissfully unaware of these alternate perspectives on her performance and abilities. She would, I expect, say that they are flatly untrue. However, whether or not these criticisms of Eve were completely fair or accurate, the real question is: Wouldn’t Eve herself have been better off if people had felt that they could approach her with their criticisms? At least then, she would have had the opportunity to refute some of the criticisms and learn from the rest.

Eve Anderson’s account is probably an important contribution to the overall record. All the same, I have trouble giving it the same credit as Michael Yoon’s. First of all, there is no trace of self-criticism, no self-reflection about the obvious mistakes Phillip Grenspun and others did to damage the company (including the initial decision to take venture capital money in the first place). Also, she has apparently removed her essay from her website (the old link simply redirects to the front of her site). The fact that she felt the need to take it down suggests that she was embarrassed to have others reading it, which suggests that she is not comfortable with everything that she said in it. (She currently works at Google, she remains active in the tech community, possibly she felt her essay was overly accusatory, in a manner that those who work with her must surely fear – after all, if they ever fire her, will she write that way about them?). Since she removed her post from her site, I had to track it down using the Internet Way Back Machine. As I am afraid this will disappear entirely at some point, I quote it at length (the following copy is from February 12th, 2002):

This is a story about a company. A company that was profitable from Day 1. A company that built products that were useful to many other companies. A company that had ethics, that treated the breadwinners (programmers) with respect, a company that could afford to help people and give away software and training, while still having enough left over to grow and save a few $million in the bank.

That is, until the venture capitalists arrived on the scene. Lying to customers and employees became commonplace. Greed replaced philanthropy as each of the company’s unique programs was dropped. But, this is a company, and the goal is to make money — any positive impact on the world is secondary, right? The real question is: how much money did they make?

The technical and managerial incompetence of the VCs and those they hired drove the company into the ground. All but 10 of the 240 employees were fired, laid off, or quit. All of the $40+ million in venture capital was squandered. The monthly operating profit turned to loss as more talentless executives were hired who threw out the company’s old, useful products and put their blind faith in engineers who spent millions building complicated software that solved no business problems.

This is a story that will teach you something about building a software product, about profitably running a company, and about what can happen if unqualified organizations obtain control.
The Birth of ArsDigita
Since the early days of the Web, I had been building web sites for big-name clients in California with my friend Aurelius Prochazka. Meanwhile, Philip Greenspun and two of his friends, Jin Choi and Tracy Adams, were doing similar work out in Massachusetts. When I moved to Massachusetts in 1998, we joined forces and were quickly able to quickly attract high profile clients, such as Levi Strauss, Environmental Defense, and MIT Press.

Our band of programmers, called ArsDigita (”Digital Arts”), was profitable from the beginning. We had no office, no marketing staff, no letterhead. But we did have a few thousand dollars’ worth of computer equipment and our five motivated selves.
The Birth of the ACS
It didn’t take long for us to realize that we were solving some of the same problems over and over again for each of our sites. It doesn’t matter if a site sells custom-made slacks, lets people share their photography knowledge with other enthusiasts, helps people fight environmental battles against companies polluting their groundwater, facilitates the trading of financial instruments, or helps people find the best combination of red, white, and sparkling wines for their next soirée.

Every site we built needed:

1. to talk to a relational database management system (RDBMS) to facilitate the collection of content from its users
2. a means for registering users and recognizing them upon their return to the site
3. a permission system to enable administration of the entire site, a section of the site, or an individual content item
4. a mechanism for grouping users so that they can be served content or given permissions appropriately

Instead of reproducing this for each client, we wrote a general data model, a few web pages, and some shared procedures, and called this collection of code the ArsDigita Community System (ACS).

We distributed the ACS free and open-source, not merely to be altruistic, but because it made sound business sense. If you are doing professional services, the best way to get your name out, have more clients find you (yes, free marketing), and improve the code base is to share it with the open-source world.

The ACS began as a small core of functionality, but more opportunities for code reuse quickly arose. Many of our clients wanted discussion forums. Quite a few needed ecommerce. Polls and portals and intranets and calendars and address books were repeatedly requested. It would have been foolish to build this functionality one-off for each client. It would have been a wasted opportunity to build this only for ourselves and not let our work reap the benefits of an open-source release. Hence we began the release of ACS modules that could run on top of the core. Dozens of useful modules were created, and that is what led to the adoption of the ACS by programmers and companies world-wide.
Growth
A small group of developers earning lots of money, making clients happy, and developing and releasing a useful software product is wonderful, but … to make a substantial impact on the world, you gotta grow.

And grow we did. At first it was difficult to hire people because developers don’t feel safe working for a company with no office or regularly-scheduled payroll. So, in the fall of 1998, we moved into an office. It didn’t cost us much to rent a lovely old house in Harvard Square (complete with showers and kitchen, both which were well-appreciated after nights of obsessive coding). In January, we began a payroll system so that people’s paychecks would no longer be tied to when our clients paid the invoices. Even if people were earning a bit less than before the structure was imposed, they were happy with the change. We were still earning a large profit each month. And now it was easy to hire people.

On January 1, 1999, ArsDigita had 5 employees. By January 1, 2000, we were up to 57, almost all of whom were developers. We had very little overhead and profits were rising. Around this time, we started looking in earnest for venture capital in order to accelerate growth and to allow ourselves the luxury of taking developers off of paying client projects so they could work full-time on our core product, the ArsDigita Community System (ACS).

By the end of March 2000, we had 110 employees (almost double what we had 3 months previously), 7 offices, healthy profits, plenty of cash in the bank, and $20 million in annual revenue, with the revenue figures still on an upward trend.

…Life post-capital
Revenue continued to rise to about $25 million in 2000. Is this due to the VCs’ genius and vision, or merely a result of the momentum built up before their arrival? Was the subsequent downfall, starting in mid-2000, due solely to the effects of the weaker economy in the United States?

It became increasingly clear to the employees, the customers, and the outside developer community that the VCs and those they had put into management had no idea what they were doing. They discarded the practices that had made ArsDigita a profitable company, destroyed the company culture, and showed their complete technical incompetence by throwing out the ACS, which had been repeately used to solve real business problems, and replacing it with new, partially closed-source software package that was hard to use, had serious performance problems, and met only a small fraction of the business needs that the ACS did.

By the middle of 2000, it was clear that the new management did not understand the mission in front of them. New engineers at our company were routinely complaining about the level of competence and experience we were provided by aD. Communications with the new CEO were unreasonable and frustrating. Contacts at aD went from programmers to project managers to sales VPs. All these people were trying hard, and in some cases doing pretty well – but aD had lost the things that made it unique and successful.
– Josh Stella, former ArsDigita client, April 26, 2001

One of the reasons I joined ArsDigita is its inspiring mission statement, which states that we do not ever lie to customers. The mission statement goes on to say that companies who lie to their customers need to spend time training their employees in the official lies before they can talk to customers, thereby making lying unprofitable…. This week, we were not honest with our customers about the severity of the security holes we discovered in the ACS. We employees even had to sit through a training session so that we would know how to discuss the security holes with our clients. This is a serious contradiction of our mission statement.
– Walt Mankowski, former ArsDigita employee, July 14, 2000

It was sad to see the company slowly being destroyed. It was as if all the life was being sucked out of the company and we had no idea why. Everything that made ArsDigita what it was slowly disappeared until all that was left was just another buzzword-spewing faceless corporation. ACS users moved on, joining in support for projects like OpenACS that still had the spirit of the former ArsDigita… Meanwhile, aD corporate slowly began to shut down programs, including the one that got me to be an ACS user in the first place: ArsDigita Prize. One day a small message appeared that said simply “The prize has been cancelled for 2001.”
– Aaron Swartz, past ArsDigita Prize winner, April 24, 2001

It is easy to locate marketing copy on ArsDigita.com. However, it is difficult to get to the information that is actually interesting to anyone building or running an online community, or deciding whether to hire ArsDigita’s services.
– anonymous user of arsdigita.com, September 4, 2000

ArsDigita was the company I dreamed of working for when I graduated… In 2000 everything began shifting. ACS 4 seemed an excellent thing, and everybody was excited, but it was never finished and then everything just turned to Java. Nothing against Java, but even I know that you can’t sell a product that’s not here yet. What happenned to the culture? None of the names and faces we knew posted to the bboards anymore. A few aD faces posted regularly, but mostly we saw a bunch of people only posting questions about the products they should be familiar with, and sporadically. Allan Shaheen only addressed developers twice, in what seemed to be posts typed by his secretary. ArsDigita’s website turned to being a brochure more than anything else, which is not bad if you don’t forget other things.
– Roberto Mello, computer science student, April 24, 2001

For months now, I’ve been trying to figure out how aD’s management can just ignore the ACS community (and the ACSish market) they way they have. Barely speaking to us; releasing incomplete, unscalable, untested software to us; and finally just abandoning the whole thing midstream. And the only thing I can think of is that they are trying to clear out the community, get rid of the community memory, for when they rollout their closed source, java solution.
– Jerry Asher, developer, April 25, 2001

I heartily agree with you about the unfinished condition of ACS 4.x. We (furfly) have lost at least one prospective client because of it, perhaps more, and the project we’re working on now is waaaay behind schedule, much of which is due to our stumbling over ACS 4.x issues. This is not to say that it is unusable, or unfixable, but only that it is unfinished – I don’t want to disrespect the hard work that went into it, only the decision to release it before it was ready.
– Janine Sisk, Furfly co-founder, April 25, 2001

ArsDigita, an e-commerce company in the midst of layoffs and a major product overhaul, is bucking the trend of comrades selling open-source software… The change will allow the company to reach profitability by the first quarter of 2002… The company laid off 29 employees in the last week.
– CNET, April 5, 2001.

The founders fight back
Philip Greenspun has never been one to hide his opinions. If he thinks that an idea is stupid, he will bluntly say so. Therefore, Philip had many things to say after April 2000.

Philip’s harsh words displeased the other board members (Allen, Chip Hazard from Greylock, Peter Bloom from General Atlantic, and ArsDigita’s COO, Ern Blackwelder) so much that they stopped having board meetings after December 2000. Instead, they had “investor meetings” where all the board members except Philip (the chairman) were invited. In March 2001, Peter Bloom sent Philip an email, threatening public humiliation if Philip didn’t resign from the board. Philip went to visit his lawyer who reminded him of his rights as majority shareholder.

It was time to regain control of our mis-managed company before it became nothing but a shell. On April 5, Philip Greenspun and Jin Choi, together holding a substantial majority of ArsDigita’s shares, had a shareholder vote that gave the founders majority control of the board. They demoted Allen from President and CEO to only President, elected Philip CEO (one spot on the board is reserved for the CEO), promoted Tracy Adams and me (both already Vice Presidents) to Executive Vice President and placed us on the board as well, removing both Allen Shaheen and Ern Blackwelder. The two venture capitalists retained their seats on the board. But we had control.

Yes, it had required drastic measures to ensure that our ideas would be heard, but we were willing to now work hand-in-hand with Allen and the VCs to return ArsDigita to a state of health. But we didn’t get the chance. Six days later, on April 11, 2001 Allen Shaheen, Ern Blackwelder, General Atlantic, and Greylock filed a lawsuit against Philip, Tracy, and me:

ALLEN SHAHEEN, ERNEST )
BLACKWELDER, GENERAL ATLANTIC )
PARTNERS 64, L.P., a Delaware )
limited partnership, GREYLOCK )
X LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a )
Delaware limited partnership )
and ARSDIGITA CORPORATION, )
a Delaware corporation, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 18821
)
PHILIP GREENSPUN, EVE A. )
ANDERSSON and TRACY E. ADAMS )
)
Defendants. )

Now, I’m not a lawyer, but I never understood how it could possibly be legal for ArsDigita Corporation to be listed as a plaintiff, since that would have (obviously) been against the wishes of ArsDigita’s majority shareholders. And how could it be legal for General Atlantic Partners, Greylock, Allen Shaheen, and Ern Blackwelder take hundreds of thousands of dollars out of ArsDigita’s bank account and use it to pay their lawyers to sue ArsDigita’s majority shareholders?

The case came very close to going to court but, at the last possible moment, the plaintiffs came to a settlement agreement with Philip. Perhaps the plaintiffs were afraid they would lose the case because the judge had looked at their “evidence” and said that he was uninterested in approximately 90% of it. The plaintiffs’ lawyers had wasted their time and, more importantly, ArsDigita’s money, preparing a case about Philip Greenspun’s personality instead of thinking about whether someone’s personality gives one a right to try to illegally seize control of a company.

In the settlement, Philip received $7.6 million. In return, he gave up more than half of his stock, resigned from the board, promised not to attempt to execute any control over the company, and signed a non-disclosure agreement. Before the settlement, Philip owned more than half of ArsDigita’s stock. Now that the VCs owned more than half the stock, they had no need to settle with any of the other defendants.

The VCs poured a few more $million into ArsDigita so that it could take a few more gasps of air before collapsing.

…Now, What?
What has ArsDigita been doing over the past year?

Lying to the employees and to the press:

Tech startups aren’t exactly on the front burner nowadays in the market for initial public offerings, but ArsDigita is steaming ahead anyway with plans to go public next year… The four-year-old Cambridge, Mass. Web software company is hoping to kick off its initial public offering some time in 2002… If it keeps growing and building its customer base, and the IPO market continues its gradual comeback, ArsDigita will be able to take itself public, Shaheen figures.
– Steve Gelsi, CBS.MarketWatch.com, May 24, 2001, a few weeks before Allen Shaheen admitted during his deposition that he didn’t think ArsDigita would ever be able to go public

Firing people, spending money:

Beginning Thursday, ArsDigita Corporation has cut a confirmed 24 (from 165) employees and announced plans to close the Berkeley, CA, office. Rumor from several connected inside sources has the final tally climbing to 67 (or higher) over the next few weeks. Late last week the CEO was demoted by the VCs and replaced with Dan Keshian (http://www.greylock.com/team/DanKeshian.asp), one of Greylock’s partners, while they wasted another $10 million (reportedly) on the company, presumably to help it stumble along to a fire sale. Those not yet gone are those in engineering, upper management, or are working on billable projects. Those on billable projects will be terminated upon project completion. Standard severance is reportedly 1 month salary plus unused vacation.
– FuckedCompany, October 11, 2001

Building products that nobody wants to use:

When the VCs and Allen Shaheen seized control in April 2000 the company had revenue, profits, a customer list of AOL, HP, MIT, Oracle, Siemens, etc., a $160+ million valuation, $41 million in cash. In about 1.5 years the same company had a product that nobody wanted to use (though it was based on more fashionable tools), no profits, no cash, and few customers. Despite the infusion of more cash and a new CEO, a Greylock partner, in the fall of 2001, the company continued to spiral downward. Now they are dead and RedHat is buying some bones.
– FuckedCompany, February 7, 2002

And trying to make some money for themselves out of the scraps:

ArsDigita, a privately held software company in Cambridge, was shut down on Tuesday. At least some of the company’s assets, primarily from its professional services division, will be sold to Red Hat Inc., an open-source Linux software company in Durham, NC, according to sources close to the company… Dan Keshian, a venture partner at Greylock, became ArsDigita’s CEO in the second half of last year to lead the company to profitability. Keshian was not present when the shutdown and sale were announced to employees.
– Jeff Miller, Mass High Tech, February 7, 2002

Lessons learned
Over the past 1.5 years, the VCs and their management team have taken a profitable, healthy, interesting company and:

* spent the profits that ArsDigita had saved
* spent all the capital raised
* destroyed an excellent software product
* released a horrible product a year behind schedule
* hired a slew of incompetent managers
* fired the people who made ArsDigita profitable
* repeatedly lied to customers
* repeatedly lied to employees
* repeatedly lied to the press
* repeatedly lied to the outside developer community
* and given themselves big bonuses as a reward

Greylock and General Atlantic Partners have mis-managed ArsDigita into the ground.

What can we learn from this? Be clear about control. Don’t assume that people with MBAs know a thing about business, let alone technology. Don’t throw out your prime source of revenue before another one is in place. Fashionable programming languages don’t equal useful software. Don’t lie. And steer clear of General Atlantic Partners and Greylock.

Most startups fail

Saturday, January 2nd, 2010

Daniel Markham notes that most startups fail.

He also links to this rant by John Pratt , the guy who did Fundable:

I cannot tell you how painful it is to watch 5 assholes take your idea and run with it and not even give you credit. I hate all 5 of them for that. If I see them, I may punch each one of them in the face. If you have never started your own company and then had someone else steal the credit for what you worked hard to develop, you don’t understand.

I think it is unwise to write in this style about your own failed startup. If you’ve got a story to tell about betrayal, it is important that others on the Web corroborate your story. A good example here would be Phillip Greenspun. First of all, in telling his story, he uses a measured tone, and he seems to stick to the facts:

By March 2000 we had grown to 80 people. I was still CEO and beginning to feel nervous that, for every task in the company, I could not say exactly who was supposed to do what and by when. But we were profitable, with monthly service contract revenue coming in at a $20 million/year rate. We’d paid nearly $1 million in income tax on our profits for calendar year 1999. Not so bad considering that we built everything from a $10,000 investment.

We’d never sought venture capital but our revenue and profits were bringing some of the top East Coast firms to our door. Most of the time these guys were being forced by the frenzied times into investment in a company and figuring out how to get revenues later (and profits much much later). ArsDigita looked a lot better than than the typical “wing and a prayer” bunch of guys with a fancy spreadsheet. Despite 1000 percent annual growth, we had cash. Most of our revenue was recurring. Most of our customers were happy and loyal.

But what is really important is that the other folks that Greenspun worked with all seem to agree on what happened. Eve Andersson writes:

The marginalization of Philip Greenspun started taking place quickly as Allen Shaheen discovered that it was difficult to work with someone who wouldn’t let him get away with incompetence and dishonesty. Over the course of 2000, more and more responsibility was taken away from Philip and given to so-called professional managers who didn’t understand the Web or software development. Instead of firing Philip outright, he was banned from decision-making meetings and was put in charge of the less profitable parts of the company.

In March, 2001, Jin Choi, the company’s 2nd-largest shareholder was fired. Jin didn’t seem to mind so much because he has never had any tolerance for anyone he deems stupid.

Around the same time, the VCs pushed out Aurelius Prochazka. Aure had built up most of ArsDigita’s west coast operations. Most of the clients were there because of Aure. He had trained most of the developers. He had personally built some of the most important modules of the ACS. He could construct an enterprise-quality site himself that would normally take a team of 4 or 5 developers to create.

John Pratt should take note. One guy ranting on the Internet is a lunatic, but several people all agreeing with each other is a story.

The decline of east coast tech

Thursday, December 31st, 2009

Adam Healey writes Charlottesville Needs More Nerds:

For some reason, there are just not a lot of startups being created here. On this mashup by fourio, web 2.0 start-ups are mapped globally. There are none, until now, in Charlottesville. Why is that? Simple. Charlottesville needs more nerds. UVA’s graduate engineering school is ranked 37th nationally. Ouch. There’s the problem right there.

Colin Steele echos the concern:

As CTO, I seem to be getting the recurring question, “Can you (hotelicopter) find the tech-savvy talent you need in Charlottesville?” It’s a valid question. Long gone are the days of Kesmai, EA, Mr. Goodbucks, and the beloved Value America. These days, we have influx of spooks, a smattering of biotech companies, and in the IT/Internet world… a whole buncha nothin’.

To me, the issue seems related to the decline of New York during this last decade. I mean, hell, if even New York was in decline, then what chance did Charlottesville have? The simple fact was that a lot of the tech industry was consolidating into Silicon Valley (or moving off shore). But if it is true that New York is set for a rebound, then perhaps other east coast locales will also see their fortunes improve.

The New York City tech revival

Monday, December 21st, 2009

Chris Dixon notes a revival of the startup scene in New York City:

But the question that has puzzled me is: why did New York City lag behind the West Coast this decade so much more than last decade? Especially since the internet in the 2000’s has been more than ever about consumers, media, and advertising – traditional New York City strengths?

I think the only explanation is that the finance bubble of 2003-2008 was a giant talent suck on the East Coast. The people I knew graduating out of top engineering or business programs on the East Cast were all trying to work at hedge funds or big banks or else felt like fish out of water and moved west. Money was flowing so freely in the finance world that there was no way the risk/reward trade off of startups could compete. Eventually it just became downright idiosyncratic to be a startup person on the East Coast. The Larry and Sergey of the East Coast were probably inventing high frequency trading algorithms at Goldman Sachs.

But this is why New York City now seems poised for a technology startup boom. The finance bubble has burst and the industry will hopefully return to its historical norm, about half its bubble size. The traditional advertising and media businesses are in disarray. The people who work in them will no doubt find new applications for their talents.

There is also a nice ecosystem developing in New York City. Union Square Ventures is one of the best VC’s in the country, with early stage investments in companies like Twitter and Etsy (that were followed on by top West Coast VCs at significant markups). Bessemer is an old firm that has a managed to stay relevant with investments in Yelp, Skype, and LinkedIn among others. There is also a new wave of scrappy Boston firms spending a lot of time in New York City – specifically Spark, General Catalyst, Flybridge, and Bain Ventures. First Round Capital out of Philadelphia is extremely active in early stage investing in New York. There are a bunch of veteran entrepreneurs actively investing in and mentoring seed stage startups. Google has a big office here and many people seem to be leaving to go start companies.

The New York City start-up scene is warming up

Monday, December 21st, 2009

A fascinating look at some of the startups based in New York City.

One thing I’ve noticed over the past year is that NYC’s version of Silicon Valley will be Soho, which has been primarily associated with the fashion industry. The combination of the falling price of leases stemming from the 2008 financial collapse, and the dropping rent (all the bankers moved out of Manhattan); there have been dozens of creative startups opening up office in Soho. I’ve listed the ones I know in the list below.

1. 20×200 sells art for everyone at ridiculously affordable prices (Soho).

2. Aviary makes creation accessible to artists of all genres.

3. Behance organizes the creative world to make their ideas happen (Soho).

4. Betaworks is an internet media company.

5. Blip.tv is the next generation television network (Soho).

6. By/Association is a private service for new introductions to remarkable people (Soho).

7. Bug Labs is a modular, open source system for building devices.

8. Boxee is the best way to enjoy entertainment from the Internet and computer on your TV.

9. Carbonmade helps you build and manage an online portfolio website (Soho).

10. ChallengePost is a marketplace for challenges.

11. Clickable is an online solution that makes creating and managing online advertising simple and effective.

12. College Humor is the best humor site on the internet.

13. Designer Pages is a free social application for finding products in architecture and interior design.

14. Drop.io allows simple real-time sharing, collaboration, and presentation.

15. Etsy is the world’s most vibrant handmade marketplace.

16. Foursquare gives you and your friends new ways of exploring the city (Soho).

17. gdgt is the new consumer electronics site by the guys behind Engadget and Gizmodo.

18. Harvest allows simple online time tracking, timesheet, and reporting (Soho).

19. Hello Health helps doctors communicate, document, and transact with their patients in person and online.

20. Hot Potato allows you to find events, join the crowd, and share the experience.

21. Hunch helps you make decisions and gets smarter the more you use it.

22. Kickstarter is a funding platform for artists, designers, filmmakers, musicians, journalists, investors, and explorers.

23. Livestream is the most powerful live broadcast platform on the internet.

24. Meetup helps groups of people with shared interests plan meetings and form offline clubs in local communities around the world.

25. OMGPOP is the #1 place to play free multiplayer games with your friends.

26. Parachutes aims to reinvent how people teach and learn.

27. Quirky is a social product development company.

28. SeamlessWeb is the fastest, easiest, and smartest way to order food delivery online.

29. Squarespace is a fully hosted, completely managed environment for creating and maintaining a website, blog or portfolio (Soho).

30. Tumblr is the easiest way to blog.

31. Vimeo is a respectful community of creative people who are passionate about sharing the videos they make.

PUBLISHING/EMAIL COMPANIES
New York City has always been the epicenter of the publishing and advertising industries. And that hasn’t changed with this list of innovative companies changing the publishing and email businesses.

1. Daily Candy is a handpicked selection of all that’s fun, fashionable, food related, and culturally stimulating in the city you’re fixated on.

2. Flavorpill is a daily guide to quality cultural events in New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Miami and London.

3. Gawker is an online media company (Soho).

4. Gilt Groupe offers luxury designers and fashion brands at prices up to 70% off retail.

5. Huffington Post offers syndicated columnists, blogs and new stories with moderated comments.

6. One King’s Lane offers exclusive sales on designer home accessories.

7. Tasting Table is a free daily email about the best of eating and drinking culture.

8. TBD is a free email newsletter that delivers one world-changing idea and one collective action to improve our future.

9. Thrillist’s daily emails sift through the crap to find the newest and best the Nation is hiding (Soho).

10. Urbandaddy brings you the single thing you need to know every day about your city.

11. Very Short List is a collection of distinct, free, daily e-mails that each recommend one must-see gem a day.

Colossus, designed and built in rural Argentina, is a machine for harvesting olives

Saturday, December 19th, 2009

Sarah Lacy writes about an interesting startup that is building farm machinery in rural Argentina:

The idea was born back in the late 1990s. Argentina offered a tax benefit to encourage the planting of some 70,000 hectares of olive trees in poor areas of the country. Argentina had less than 20,000 hectares before the change. The catch was these groves had to be high density, a minimum of 300 trees per hectare. The incentives have worked well enough that Argentina’s Ministry of Economy and Production estimates that the country could be a top ten producer of the world’s olive oil supply within the next decade.

Olive groves take about three years to mature and Bonadeo—a self-proclaimed “soybean man” and long-time farmer—noticed a problem before a lot of other people: Who was going to harvest all these olives? Harvesting olives is expensive and time-consuming and has to be done in a 70-day window. There just wasn’t the labor in Argentina, especially given the high-density plots. It would take 800 people to harvest 1,200 hectares. “That’s more like a military operation than agriculture,” Mourelle says.

So began years of trial and error building the Colossus, a huge machine that, crassly put, looks like it’s having its way with an olive tree. The machine straddles a row of trees and rubber tentacles gently swat off the olives at rapid speed. The arms can move in and out to hug the canopy of the tree—all controlled by a joystick in the air-conditioned, comfortable cab. The company is doing roughly $4 million a year in revenues and sells the machines in six countries. The Colossus increases productivity ten-fold and cuts harvesting costs by a third once the cost of the machine is paid back.

It was a humble beginning. Bonadeo barely had a working prototype and no customers. There’s no such thing as venture capital in Argentine farm country. Without money, he couldn’t build more machines. Bonadeo used to befriend olive farm managers to find out when the owners would be in town. He and his team would crowd into a van and tow the Colossus over for cold calls. Sometimes he was laughed at, sometimes the owner wouldn’t be there after all. “There’s no way you guys can build this business from here,” potential buyers said, even when they saw the machine working. It was disheartening.

The only reason the first Colossus was sold was luck. Two farms were close to signing, but not quite ready to commit to the pricey $500,000 sticker price. So the smaller one called up the larger one and offered to split it with him and share the machine. Simply out of Argentine machismo the owner of the larger farm decided he wasn’t going halfsies on any farm equipment, called Bonadeo into his office and said he had five minutes to make a sale.

“What’d you say?” I asked.

“Hamana…hamana…hamana…” he joked.

It didn’t matter what he said, the man bought one anyway. Soon after that an Australian company placed and order for three machines. Three! “Not bad, fat boy,” Bonadeo said to himself. MaqTec was in business.

It will be fascinating to see if this company survives. It has everything going against it – distance from centers of innovation, lack of capital, limited domestic markets, a nation with a historically broken political system, a culture that till recently valued conservative social traditions over innovation, etc. 100 years ago Argentina was the 12th wealthiest nation on Earth, per capita. Its decline was due to several factors, though the biggest of all was probably the lack of education of its citizens, which fed a series of social pathologies that lead to a broken political system and then dictatorship. I would love to see Argentina revive. I don’t doubt that innovators like Bonadeo will play a crucial role in any revival that happens. But, wow, talk about an uphill fight.

On a different topic, I’m glad to see TechCrunch escape from the suffocating provincialism of most American business news. It is appropriate that a weblog devoted to cutting edge subjects should show leadership in recognizing the amount of innovation going on in the developing countries.

I am concerned about that provincialism. It is an ominous sign of where America’s thinking is at. With the economy in a coma, and competent economists suggesting the coma will last another 5 years, it is clear a lot of the most important innovation of the next decade will be happening elsewhere. So why is Sarah Lacy such a relatively rare figure? Why aren’t there a 100 Sarah Lacys, or a 1,000 Sarah Lacys? Why aren’t more writers going overseas to tell the American public what is going on over there?

WP Questions, a site where WordPress experts can answer WordPress questions for money

Wednesday, December 9th, 2009

Darren Hoyt and I have launched a new website. My ideas about this site grew out of m frustration with Experts Exchange. I’ve written about the evolution of my thoughts over on the WP Questions blog.

Darren has written a summary of everything that WP Questions is, and isn’t.

We used the Symfony framework to build this site. I’ve written a somewhat technical post, over on Symfony Nerds, explaining why this was a good choice for us.

The site took Darren and I about a month to develop. I thought about the right structure for the database during the last week of October, and we got to work in early November. We both took a month long break from doing work for clients, and pretty much just worked on this site, full time, for the month. Our focus was a minimalist but sufficient feature set, a clean design, and a database structure that will be flexible in the face of future changes (among other things, I was wary of too many foreign key relationships).

This last spring I was thinking about question and answer sites where money might be exchanged. On May 5th, I wrote this in a email:

“I’ve the easiest time imagining building out a site for a particular niche… Personally, I’d love a site devoted to programming, where I could put up a question for $20 or $30. Just this week I lost 4 hours tracking down an obscure conflict in the Javascript used on a site – one script was used to fix the PNG transparency problem in IE6, and another script, which preloaded large images used in rollovers, was triggering the first script too often, adding extra images to the page. I would have loved to pay $25, or even $50, to let some IE6 specialist tackle that one. I could imagine being a customer of such a site.”

Our first day went well:

1,389 visitors

200 users signed up

A few paid questions

150 tweets on Twitter

We are starting off focused on a small niche: web developers who use WordPress. If the site is successful, we will roll out similar sites for other, broader technologies: Java, Ruby, Rails, Grails, SQL, .NET, Oracle, etc.

As I said today on our blog, in reaction to user responses:

I’ve been working on websites for 10 years, and I’m very pleased with how our first day went – much better than average. We received a lot of valuable bug reports and thoughtful feedback. I was pleased to see some questions posted. Our fees are 9% plus 50 cents. PayPal takes about 3% and 30 cents, so our net profit from yesterday was less than $10 dollars, but, hey, that means we made more on our first day than Twitter made during its first 2 years. Which leaves me hopeful that we are, in fact, offering a service that provides real utility to people. And as we listen to your feedback and implement the better ideas, we hope to be able to offer an even greater service in the future.

An uber-mega-corporation of startups where people circulate

Friday, November 20th, 2009

A competitive eco-system is like an uber-mega corporation, loosely joined:

Something I’ve realised and have to admit is that while obviously the absolute pool of talent is smaller here in the UK/Europe than it is in the U.S. (and that cannot be disputed nor is it anything more than a function of population) another factor. It is one which I keep hoping will chang, because if it doesn’t it threatens to make a small pool even smaller. And that is a cultural and behavioural issue: work ethic.

As anyone who’s ever been there or visited will attest, in Silicon Valley everyone is working *all of the time*.

And while this might seem unhealthy, not scalable, obsessive, manic or simply ridiculous, from an ecoystem perspective it’s basically unbeatable. If you want to build companes and ride the wave of innovation, it’s a 24/7 preoccupation — not just a lifestyle business. By contrast, I am in London-based startups’ offices all the time and I am gobsmacked when they are nearly empty by 6:30 PM.

Where is the sense of urgency? Where is the need for speed? Where is the competitive and insanely obsessive drive to “kick ass” and kill the competition, status quo or the incumbent corporates?

I understand the need for work-life balance and keeping things in perspective but from an investor point of view, I’m happier and have more confidence in future success if I see entrepreneurs working their asses off.

And don’t get me wrong, this doesn’t have to be “in the office”, but I used the office hours as one measurement. I’m simply talking about working at all — and just being online, responsive and present (twitter, IM, email, updates on websites, releases, pushes etc).

This is just my [likely unpopular] view, but in silicon valley the thinking is usually along the lines of “why can’t we get that done now” or “let me just finish this off now, while I can, before I go,” etc.

You have to remember that the culture there is “launch and iterate”. By contrast, European startups (not the good ones I might add) too often depend on an old fashioned version/release model. That’s nice for a good lifestyle – but it doesn’t create fast moving companies. And fast moving companies require people to nurture them 24/7.

By contrast what I observe here is more along the lines of “it can wait” or “what’s the problem if we take care of that tomorrow” or “no harm done, no big deal, the world won’t end” and “yes it’s in the queue”. I’m afraid to say this is a huge difference in attitude.

And it’s not about when or at what hours people are in their offices (or even working out of office). In Silicon Valley, even when folks aren’t strictly working or at work, they are still working. Even when they’re out clubbing, partying, eating dinner or just hanging out … They are working because everyone they’re hanging out with is in the industry and related to their work.

Your best friends are co-founders, competitors, business development partners, your lawyers or your event co-sponsors. You date, hook up with or marry your co-workers, your business development managers, your PR reps. It’s all incestuous and a very small-world and quite possibly incredibly unhealthy (although it’s clearly worked for many otherwise the valley would have collapsed by now in an earthquake of divource and law-suits).

But from an investment and knowledge-enhancing-viral-feeding point of view it’s hugely valuable. It’s like one massive petri dish. An uber-mega-corporation of startups where people might circulate between Google, Yahoo! Apple and other companies in between startups. But it keeps everyone going, thinking and buzzing about their work all the bloody time.

Are corporate programmers bad for startups?

Saturday, November 7th, 2009

Kevin Dewalt suggests that programmers with experience in large corportions are bad for startups, because the emphasis in corporations is on doing things the right way, whereas the emphasis in startups has to be on cutting corners so that you can hip quickly:

So how did I design the database for my most recent startup? Having been in situations where poorly managed database relationships resulted in months of rework, I used foreign keys. That was my experience, and I’m guessing the experience of the developers who made the comments above.

Unfortunately I found that foreign keys in my Rails migrations were a constant source of headaches. Moreover, I decided to migrate to Heroku during the project and had to re-write the foreign keys for Postgres instead of MySQL. What did I learn about customers in this process? Nothing.

In retrospect, I believe I followed bad practice for lean startups building working prototypes. Database integrity is an important issue when you have achieved some measure of success.

May I be so blessed to have these type of problems in my next startup.

The venture capital model is broken

Saturday, August 29th, 2009

The venture capital model is broken:

Within the past 3 years I’m seeing a huge tsunami of innovation that has nothing to do with technology advantage (a cornerstone of the venture capital market) but instead business model or market demand oriented solutions – technology is become less of a core driver. This is turning the venture playbook upside down.

The article mentioned above talks about what I call “market factors” from a venture perspective- the liquidity market (and regulation mainly liquidity). Because of the breakdown in liquidity there are just to many company that is causing a “backup” in the system. The venture capitalists depend on liquidity to exit out the companies in their portfolio. So if the venture capitalists don’t change their model the trickle-down effect hurts entrepreneurship.

I would like to see new funding models. It would help if the various state governments (in the US) offered standard models for incorporation other than the C-form. I started a company in 2003 where we used the flexibility of the law, in regards to LLCs, to mimic certificates for my tiny company. Then I got all my friends to buy a share for $100. So that company was an LLC that in many ways imitated a C-form corporation. But myself and my business partners burned through $5,000 of legal fees to get the right agreement. I would love to see the government offer that model as a standard, a sort of hybird of C-form and LLC. The goal would be to make it easier for entrepreneurs to raise money from strangers, without having to look toward Wall Street. I realize some people will respond with concerns about fraud – those concerns are valid, but they can be gotten around by other aspects of the LLC model, especially the understanding that everyone has some of the old rights that a partner would have had in a partnership – in particular, the ability to examine the corporate accounts. We now know, from examples such as Enron and more recently with GE, that big companies, even with formal audits, can lie about their finances. The best protection against fraud is transparency.

I wouldn’t say that the model I worked out in 2003 is necessarily the one that the whole world should follow, but I do strongly believe that there are C-form/LLC hybirds out there that can facilitate early stage funding while also lowering the risk of fraud.

I will never have enough money

Friday, August 28th, 2009

I’ve been reading John C. Bogle’s book, Enough. He makes the argument that we live in an era where our business leaders have forgotten what enough is. However much they have, they need more: more cars, more jets, more yachts, more homes, more money. Bogle feels that the ethical lapses we’ve seen in recent years were facilitated by the loss of the concept of enough. It is a good book. People who are interested in questions of business ethics should read it.

On a related note, today the news page over at YCombinator pointed to this old article “How Much Scratch is Enough?” written by Ryan D’Agostino.

Okay, let’s see. Say I give myself eight years—no, better make it ten. Just to be safe. I figure I’ll definitely want a great apartment in Manhattan. Near Central Park. Plus a summer house in, say, the Carolinas. Nothing too big, but nice. Also, enough to put a couple of kids through college. Prep school too. Oh, and Colorado. A condo, on the slopes. Gotta have a nice set of wheels—Beemer—and an SUV (to get around Colorado). Then maybe I’ll open up a little cafe somewhere, or get a boat. Yeah, a boat would be cool. Ten years. Figure $15 million. I think I can do it. But then I’m out. Definitely. Out for good. Just sailing around on my boat.

This is how it starts: with a pledge. A promise to yourself that you will make a certain amount of money—that you will hit your number—by a certain age, and that you will, upon reaching that carefully calculated goal, get out. Go sail your boat. Or open your bookstore or your bed and breakfast, or be a philanthropist or whatever. You won’t have to worry about money. You’ll invest a big, juicy nugget and live off the interest, which will be more than enough.

For some people, though, that word becomes a stumbling block: enough. It makes the calculations tricky, and sometimes, it changes the plan. Enough creeps slowly but steadily upward, like ivy spreading imperceptibly over an entire side of a house, and once it does you can’t picture what the house looked like before. At first, you aim high—way into the millions—and while part of you knows that chances are you won’t really end up with that much, part of you knows there’s a chance you will. You see the number in big, block numerals in your mind, and the corners of your mouth curl up into a little smile, just for a second, when you picture yourself hitting the mark.

Bogle and D’Agostino are both criticizing consumption (cars, houses, jets, etc). I’ve no problem with that. I’m critical of consumption too. But I think it is odd that they both write as if consumption is the only thing that a person might want money for.

For my part, I will never have enough money.

I have in my head an unlimited number of ideas for new businesses. Some are web-based, and of these, some are content sites and some offer a software service. But also, some of the businesses I’d like to pursue have nothing to do with the web. I’ve some software ideas to help biologists and, in particular, to help people learn biology (I’ve just been studying biology myself, so I’m aware of things that could help me learn it better). Some of these ideas are simple, such as a calculator that allows certain kinds of very easy programming (easier than Matlab). And having only recently started studying advanced math, I’m aware that people who take up math as adults, and who are self-taught, may have a set of questions that are different than what high school students ask. And I’ve various creative endeavors I’d like pursue. For instance, I’ve been writing a screenplay for a movie loosely based on the events that occurred at Enron.

The various ideas I’ve got in my head right now could keep me busy for 40 years, and I could easily burn through $200 million pursing them all. I really doubt that I’m going to succeed at all of these endeavors, and I seriously doubt I’ll ever have anything like that kind of money, but I figure I might as well just give it a try and see how far I get. And if a miracle happens, and I end up with $200 million, I’m very certain that by that time my overall goals will have expanded to the point that I’ll need a billion to fund my further ambitions.

I will never have enough money.

D’Agostino suggests that when you finally get the millions of dollars that you’ve been aiming for, you smile: “You see the number in big, block numerals in your mind, and the corners of your mouth curl up into a little smile, just for a second, when you picture yourself hitting the mark.”

I think the opposite is true: the most exciting part of launching a new business is the first dollar that you get. The first few dollars bring a huge thrill, even though the numbers are trivial:

“Our first $100 dollars!”

And then:

“Out first $1,000 dollars!”

And then:

“OMIGOD! Our first $10,000 dollars!”

After awhile the thrill starts to fade. No one celebrates when a new business reaches the $30,000 mark. I assume there is some satisfaction to reaching a $1,000,000 (never been there myself) but I have trouble imagining it is as exciting as the first few dollars that come in, those early dollars that give you your first clue that maybe you’ve a product or service that people will actually want to give you money for.

I do not need multiple cars, houses, jets or yatchs. 10 years from now, I’ll be happy if I have a small apartment in New York City, my current Volvo, which I hope to keep going despite some body rust, and $100,000,000 of software projects that are all going well.

In his fictional scenario (I assume it is fictional) D’Agostino says: “But then I’m out. Definitely. Out for good. Just sailing around on my boat.”

I can’t imagine ever wanting to get out. The thrill of launching and running a business is the most fun thing I’ve yet discovered. If I got out, what would I do? I’d simply get back in.

Focus on your startup. Do not do anything else.

Tuesday, August 18th, 2009

Paul Graham offers advice about how to keep your startup from dying:

The number one thing not to do is other things. If you find yourself saying a sentence that ends with “but we’re going to keep working on the startup,” you are in big trouble. Bob’s going to grad school, but we’re going to keep working on the startup. We’re moving back to Minnesota, but we’re going to keep working on the startup. We’re taking on some consulting projects, but we’re going to keep working on the startup. You may as well just translate these to “we’re giving up on the startup, but we’re not willing to admit that to ourselves,” because that’s what it means most of the time. A startup is so hard that working on it can’t be preceded by “but.”

In particular, don’t go to graduate school, and don’t start other projects. Distraction is fatal to startups. Going to (or back to) school is a huge predictor of death because in addition to the distraction it gives you something to say you’re doing. If you’re only doing a startup, then if the startup fails, you fail. If you’re in grad school and your startup fails, you can say later “Oh yeah, we had this startup on the side when I was in grad school, but it didn’t go anywhere.”

You can’t use euphemisms like “didn’t go anywhere” for something that’s your only occupation. People won’t let you.

One of the most interesting things we’ve discovered from working on Y Combinator is that founders are more motivated by the fear of looking bad than by the hope of getting millions of dollars. So if you want to get millions of dollars, put yourself in a position where failure will be public and humiliating.

Entrepreneurs in San Francisco are better than the entrepreneurs in New York City

Tuesday, August 18th, 2009

Zed Shaw is moving to San Francisco. He wrote the following comparison of entrepreneurs in San Francisco and New York City:

To give a great example of what it’s like in NYC, I received this email from someone when I posted I was looking for work in SF

I have an idea for a business involving level 2 stock quote analysis that will be able to ask arbitrary questions of the NYSE data stream using indexed log files in Hadoop as well as a backup idea to cannibalize the enterprise search market by doing what they do for cheaper money using this technology and lucene. In both cases, I’ll need a badass coder to help me with the application and deployment parts, ideally using a dynamic JVM language. … I have personal funds to work for 6 months so I’m planning on doing this for 2-3, presenting a prototype to some financial people and ideally getting funding and connections to sell it in one fell swoop. Just registering the idea. Real-time analysis of a whole bunch of email could be an option as well, if you had a business idea.

Yes, I actually did receive this in response to my blog post. This is actually a very common pitch and style for the NYC entrepreneur. This cocky, muscular, alpha-male-wannabe “my dick is bigger than yours come work for me and make me rich” is tiring and the main reason I’m leaving. If NYC entrepreneurs want to know why they can’t find “techies” (another way of saying “fucking nerd”), all you have to do is read the above.

By comparison the companies that contacted me from San Francisco were all incredibly polite, professional, and told me exactly why I should work for them. Each one immediately pointed me to their existing technology. Each one told me their funding levels. Each one had their business model thought out to some degree. There wasn’t a single company that I thought didn’t get the business, or was trying to screw me.

When it comes down to it, the primary difference between the companies who contacted me in SF vs. NYC is this:

* NYC prospects were looking for a badass/ninja/rockstar beta-male “techie” employee to make them rich creating lame applications for giant Finance/Fashion/Marketing companies.

* SF prospects were looking for a partner to get rich with them creating great products for customers.

Now obviously the SF companies are all really looking for an employee to make them rich. The difference is in their approach and how they don’t say it so blatantly or in such a gigantic douchebag way. Their touch was lighter, more collaborative, and definitely not with the attitude of me being some “beta-male” to their “alpha”. That lack of cocky dickwad douchebag in the SF technology scene will be refreshing and interesting.

There is some truth to his account of entrepreneurs in New York City, though I also ran into a lot of the same attitude in Virginia. I’ve run into a lot of clients who have the attitude “I am a genius, I just need some coder to bring my ideas to life.” Invitations to real collaboration are rare. My sense is that a lot of the entrepreneurs that I’ve dealt with on the east coast are at the unconscious incompetence level of learning. They simply do not know how little they know, nor do they know enough to appreciate how much I know.

Geography still matters: physical proximity is essential to agile practices

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

I recently oversaw a project that had me working with a distributed team (in the US, Europe and India). The same project also worked exclusively with independent contractors, whose work was hired on an assignment basis. The work was for a new web-startup. I have some concerns about such an arrangement being used for a new, innovative project. I’m going to attempt to explain my concerns in this essay.

First, I’ll talk about using freelance, independent contractors for a web start-up. The seeming advantage of having no permanent employees is that the operation has no fixed costs. An advantage? It depends. If you really want to avoid all fixed costs, simply close your business. Being in business means having expenses, the real issue is whether you are making a profit – does the labor you hire help you make more money than the cost of the labor?

The project I oversaw moved slowly, and some of the slowness can be attributed to the freelance nature of the labor we hired. The programmers would do whatever we asked them to, and they all did high quality work. However, because we made no long term commitment to them, they of course had to keep busy with other work. Sometimes we needed them but they were busy with their other clients. Also, they were not part of the conversations we were having in New York City, so they lacked a broad overview of the project and its goals, so they could not easily take the initiative to move ahead on their own.

If a project has no particular deadline, or if it is simple, then working with independent contractors is a great way to keep fixed costs low. However, if a project is suppose to move fast, or if it needs to achieve certain deadlines, and especially if it is very complex, then I would recommend against the use of this kind of arrangement. For fast moving, complex projects, you need full-time, committed programmers.

Now I’ll offer some thoughts about agility, and the importance of physical proximity.

Agile practices have 2 main hopes:

1.) to allow a fast-forming team to quickly become highly-productive.

2.) to control costs by ensuring discipline in regards to goals and deadlines.

I used the word “hopes” instead of “goals” because the ultimate aim of agile practices is more of an ideal to be aspired to rather than a reality that can be achieved, and by that, all I mean is that we are constantly learning more about what these practices truly mean, and in the future we can reasonably hope to do better than we are doing today. I’m speaking for the entire profession of computer programming when I say this.

I am in the United States, in New York City. I’ve been working on websites since 1996. I’ve worked on many small teams, and over the years I’ve used some agile practices, such as frequent iterations, frequent in-person consultations with the client, and unit tests. When I started on this last project, I first thought it would offer the chance to experiment with a fuller range of agile practices. However, I came to realize that most agile practices depend on physical proximity. The programmers need to be able to meet, preferably every day (”every day” in the sense of casual conversation, not “every day” in the sense of “let’s have a formal meeting”). Consider some of these practices:

1.) pair programming (two people looking at the same screen, checking for errors)

2.) the use of index cards to map objects

3.) stand up meetings (meetings kept short and lively because everyone is standing)

None of these make any sense if the programmers are in different countries.

I’d also add code reviews. One can do a code review at a distance, but I think in person is much more effective. And code reviews don’t make much sense when you are working with independent contractors. Code reviews are meant to develop each programmer’s long-term abilities, and also they are useful for helping the whole team agree on certain programming habits. But one would have to have a long-term relationship with the programmers before doing such a thing would make sense.

Programming is an art, and art needs passion. Many agile practices are aimed at soliciting a greater emotional commitment from the programmers. I might write “For an agile project to go well, the programmers need to emotionally commit to it” but that isn’t quite right. What would be more correct would be “For an agile project to go well, the programmers need to emotionally commit to their own professional ideal.” That is, they need to care about the craft of programming. They need to be constantly pushing themselves to always be better programmers.

I would never argue that agile practices are needed on every project. If a project is routine, then long-distance, non-agile practices might be perfect. For instance, suppose you decide to launch a new online magazine. After researching your options, you decide you will use WordPress as the software that powers your site. I’d suggest you find a good designer, local to you, and work with them to come up with the design. Once you have the design, the rest of the process is mundane. You could certainly hire a team in India to install WordPress and implement your design for you. And you would not need agile practices for such a project. In fact, you do not even need great programmers for such a task. Mediocre programmers can do a reasonable job with tasks that are standard, routine and mundane.

However, I would argue that agile practices are needed at projects that need to be fast moving (this would include most start-ups), or at any project where the aim is to create something altogether new and unique. If your project is venturing out into the great unknown, if you are going where no one has ever gone before, you will need a team of excellent, committed adventurers to go along with you.

Let’s look at the history of agile practices, going back centuries.

In the 1990s, DARPA invested some money in agile research, which lead to such books as that by Goranson: Agile Virtual Enterprises.

Goranson looks back at the whaling industry of the mid-1800s and examines how 2 small towns in Massachusetts were able to capture 90% of the whaling industry, when most of the actual hunting was done in the South Pacific. He found that the patterns of hiring and team building had much in common with what start-ups aspire to nowadays – a tight-knit, fast-forming team of highly competent professionals held together by a commonly understood body of professional ethics and expectations.

Goranson emphasizes the role of geographical concentration (and therefore physical proximity), to the evolution of culturally unique traits, leading to competitive advantages:

Geographical and professional isolation allowed for the evolution of a unique and very effective system which for many years put a brand new, fairly high risk/high payoff, virtual enterprise in the water at the rate of one every two weeks. The return of each whaling expedition triggered the formation of another. It was considered an invitation to bad luck to reuse the same combination of partners, so during the six to nine months it took to recondition the ship for another voyage, the owner of the boat assembled a new group of key players who would join him in setting up the basic physical and social conditions needed for a successful venture.

The primary partners required to launch a voyage consisted of a ship owner, an insurer (of the ship cargo), a provisioning financier to supply the expedition with food and other consumables, a captain, and often a manufacturer who agreed to buy the oil at a set price. This component of the partnership was formed in the first couple of months, the partners being determined partially by availability.

A month or less before the ship was ready to sail, a secondary group of partners, the crew, was formed. They shared a distinct cultural background; almost none of them had, or would ever, serve in the navy or the merchant marine. This professional distinctiveness, coupled with an intense geographical concentration, fostered the development of a unique culture based on the virtual enterprise.

Goranson uses the word “agility” to refer to fast forming supply chains, and also (relatedly) the ability to overcome the administrative costs that might keep a new supply chain from forming (in the early 90s, when DARPA funded Goranson’s work, one problem seemed especially prevalent: the fact that the most innovative technologies in America were being developed at small start-ups, and yet large Fortune 500 companies were having difficulty integrating small start-ups into their supply chains, because of the administrative hassles of developing relationships with a multitude of small companies). He uses the word “virtual” to refer to an organization that is project-specific and not meant to last. For instance, in the modern context, the best examples of agile, virtual enterprises are in the movie industry. Each movie is its own independent business, and the production of each movie entails the fast formation of a team of highly competent professionals who understand they are being hired to work on a specific, time-limited project, which will disband as soon as the project is done.

Whaling ships and modern web start-ups share certain traits::

Every voyage included a team of skilled craftsmen – carpenter, blacksmith, cooper, and a sailmaker (often a boatwright, a rigger and a cook were also in this class) – whose combined expertise allowed the enterprise to respond effectively to a broad range of situations. Each of these professionals, along with the tools, supplies, and sometimes apprentices they brought abroad, formed an essentially self-contained business which was integrated into the enterprise as a whole. In these cases, it was not just the person who signed up for the voyage, but their business. From the shipowner to the cook, everyone was paid with a pre-arranged percentage of the take.

In other words, every ship was its own little agile, fast-forming start-up.

Goranson’s use of the word “agility” is somewhat different than the way the word “agility” is used by its proponents in the software industry, but the meaning of the word overlaps for both groups in the sense of “the ability to get supply from a new source quickly”. Consider the words of the Agility Manifesto:

We have come to value:

Individuals and interactions over processes and tools

Working software over comprehensive documentation

Customer collaboration over contract negotiation

Responding to change over following a plan

With only minor tweaks of the wording, you could use the above as a statement of the professional culture that pervades Hollywood. The emphasis is on doing what is necessary to get something working into production fast. By contrast, the slow moving process of low trust, heavily documented, laborious negotiated, carefully vetted contracts are anathema in this context.

(Stephen M. R. Covey has a written a book called The Speed Of Trust, which does an excellent job explaining how much a project speeds up when the participants can trust each other, and therefore how important it is to work toward facilitating the long-term development of trust in any business relationship.)

Goranson emphasized that one of the legal traditions that the whaling industry and movie industry share is a very strong reliance on verbal contracts, as opposed to written contracts and detailed documentation. Goranson points to the bankruptcy of Kim Bassinger as an outstanding example of the importance given to verbal contracts in the movie industry. (Bassinger met some producers for dinner to discuss the possibility of her starring in their movie Boxing Helena. She promised, over dinner, to star in the movie. When she later backed out of her promise, they were able to sue her for $8 million.) The Agility Manifesto de-emphasizes contracts, but still puts a heavy emphasis on the importance of verbal communication, a point made clear by “Customer collaboration over contract negotiation”.

Goranson emphasizes the role that geographical concentration played in allowing this culture of virtual enterprises to flourish. I believe that geographic concentration still plays the predominate role in allowing the continued evolution of unique agile practices.

I’ve had it suggested to me that the cheapness of overseas programmers (in places like India) can speed a project up, simply because, since they are cheap, you can hire a lot more of them. This is flatly contradicted by Fred Brooks thesis in The Mythical Man-Month. When the System 360 project was running late at IBM, Brooks tried to speed up the project by adding more programmers to the team. But he found that the additional programmers actually slowed the project down. Each new programmer became one more person who needed to be kept up to date with the latest documentation – and every few additional programmers required that a new manager be brought into the project to manage them. The growing complexity of communication across a growing mass of workers helped to slow the project down, rather than speed it up.

In this sense, the cheapness of overseas programmers actually encourages bad habits. Because they are cheap, you may get tricked into thinking that you can hire a lot of them. But the more you hire, the more time you will need to invest trying to keep everyone unified in their understanding of what the code is suppose to do. And after a certain number, you’ll need to start hiring additional managers.

If you are a project manager, and you rely on the cheapness of your programmers to keep a project’s costs under control, then you need to fire yourself. There is only one correct way to keep costs under control, and that is through disciplined focus on goals and deadlines. Agile practices have evolved to make it easier to keep complex projects on track. To the extent that geography matters to agile practices, then geography matters for the goals and deadlines of your project.

Nicole Radziwill approaches this subject from a different angle, but she makes a similar point about the importance of geography:

Space does matter. We know this when we are designing facilities and plant layouts, for example, because one of our common considerations is to minimize traffic between areas and departments. More often than not, we do this to minimize the time spent moving people or equipment around a plant, so that time is not wasted. But the same concept could apply to our supply chains. Why aren’t we minimizing the time that components or goods spend traveling through the supply chain, when it could lead to reductions in energy costs? Furthermore, why aren’t we shortening our supply chains to strengthen local and regional businesses, and train the next generation of skilled workers (who can actually do something useful for the regional economy)?

The logic has been something like this: energy is cheap, therefore transportation is cheap, and transportation is easily available and accessible through third-party providers like FedEx and UPS. But I can’t shake the feeling that “supply chain status quo” is not good for quality in the long-term – because it encourages us to source the products and components that are most affordable, rather than the ones that might help us cultivate a quality consciousness in our local areas.

To offer a partial answer to the question that Nicole poses, I think the reason why products get sourced to where they are most affordable (at the current moment, in the short term) is that people tend to fear losses more than they value potential gains. There is an abundant literature on this subject. In regards to sourcing, buyers go with what is cheapest in the short-term, rather than developing long-term innovations that might lead to much greater gains in the future. Consider:

Prospect theory… argues that people center their expectations around a variable and moveable reference point. The reference point is most easily thought of as the status quo, though it is not always so. In most situations, people are more likely to ensure that they preserve their current situation, than to risk losses by seeking potential improvements. Indeed, people tend to sacrifice a great deal in order to maintain their current situation. As Levy notes, “people tend to be risk-averse in choices among gains, but risk acceptant with respect to losses.” This is often the problem in intractable conflicts; the risks required to resolve the conflict seem much too great compared to the potential losses. This sort of framing is what leads ultimately to hurting stalemates. Loss-oriented framing is, ultimately, this tendency to minimize losses while missing opportunities to improve one’s situation.

The status quo of any culture, in the short-term, can be regarded as an under-developed blandness, relative to the unknown brilliance of some unknown future innovation. It takes a leap of faith to believe in that unknown future brilliance. It is easier, and safer, to go with what is cheapest in the short-term. This is cowardice, but it is extremely common. True business leadership is rare.

In terms of developing some unknown future brilliance, I’m thinking especially of those cultural traits that, in part, give rise to comparative advantage. There is, at this point, a mountain of literature about the advantages that agile teams have when it comes to fast-forming, fast-moving projects. Agility is a cultural innovation that deserves further refinement, and each nation, depending on its legal traditions and its labor laws, is going to develop agility in a unique direction. The future development of these potential innovations is undermined by the extended supply chains that send work to distant parts of the world. I’m arguing that, just as Goranson stressed geographical isolation as playing a role in the evolution of a uniquely competitive culture in Massachusetts, then the dispersal of work from a geographic center must lead to the opposite – the dissolution of uniquely competitive cultural traits.

I can imagine someone reading this essay and raising certain objections. What about Linux? What about Apache? Certain open source projects have been successful with teams that are scattered all over the world. But then, these were not fast moving projects. Teams that never meet in-person can become highly productive, but it takes years. And by the time these projects hit their strides, much of the core team had, in fact, traveled to different countries and met each other in-person.

One other fact argues for the importance of physical proximity. For a team to be highly productive, it needs to have both high levels of communication and high levels of trust. Body language is important to trust. In a normal, in-person conversation, the bulk of the communication is non-verbal. Below I’m going to quote from an article that is aimed at teaching salespeople how to make more sales. On a start-up, the team members are not trying to sell products to each other, but they are often in the position of having to try to sell a given strategy to each other. One team member may feel that their site should be pitched to consumers, another team member may feel strongly that the site needs to be pitched to businesses. The success of the start-up depends on all of the team members being to able to listen to all points of view, take in the maximum amount of information and opinion, and reach the best decision.

It really doesn’t matter how knowledgeable you are about your product line or how many closing techniques you have mastered, unless you earn your prospect’s trust and confidence you’re not going to make the sale.

…Body language is a mixture of movement, posture and tone of voice. Research indicates that in a face-to-face conversation, more than 70 percent of our communication is nonverbal.

Our body language reveals our deepest feelings and hidden thoughts to total strangers. In addition, nonverbal communication has a much greater impact and reliability than the spoken word. Therefore, if your prospect’s words are incongruent with his or her body language gestures, you would be wise to rely on the body language as a more accurate reflection of their true feelings.

On a slightly humorous note, I’d like to offer a movie review. The best movie ever made about an agile, virtual enterprise was Akira Kurosawa’s 1954 movie, The Seven Samurai. Of course we need to translate the movie into business-speak before the comparison becomes clear. I’m only partly kidding when I write this. I really do believe this movie offers a good example of some of the above ideas.

In the opening scene, we meet the client (poor village farmers). We then come to see their problem: bandits who plan to raid the village as soon as the harvest is in. The villagers then go to a big city to hire a contractor who can solve this problem for them. They meet Kambei, a samurai. Though the villagers can pay very little, he takes pity on them and agrees to help them. He therefore steps into the role of project manager. He must then assemble a team, and this part is pure agile enterprise in practice. The city is full of many samurai, and out of this sea of potential recruits, a group of 6 is selected. These are highly skilled workers with a strong emotional commitment to their own professional ideal – that is, they all strive to be the best samurai that they can be. The 7 samurai then set out for the village. They almost instantly form a tight-knit, highly cohesive team, because they share a commonly understood body of professional ethics and expectations. The enterprise is “virtual” in the sense that Goranson uses the word – it is project-specific, and will disband as soon as the project is complete. At the village, the samurai work in close consultation with the client to ensure the goals of the project (the defense of the village). Finally, after a decisive fight, the goals of the project are achieved – the bandits are defeated. The client is happy. The surviving samurai then disband.

In this movie, the samurai are recruited in the same fashion as sailors might have been recruited for a whaling ship, or the same way that a computer programmer might be recruited for a web start-up.

To recap, my current experience teaches me that:

1.) Agile teams should be small (as per Brooks).

2.) They should meet in person several times a week.

3.) Everyone on the team must be highly competent.

4.) Everyone on the team must be emotionally committed to their own professional ideal.

5.) For the duration of the project, everyone on the team should be full-time

Furthermore, on projects that aim to be unique or innovative, or on projects that are complex, or on projects that need to be fast-moving, I will be discouraging clients from these practices:

1.) part-time, independent contractors

2.) distributed teams, with workers geographically dispersed.

One last point, unrelated to the rest. A number of people have said to me that they feel the cheapness of overseas workers (in places like India) is driving down wages in America. I do not believe this is true. Wages in America have declined over the last 40 years, but that is because the American people have themselves become unwilling to invest in their own country. Consider the fact that in 1955 the average middle class family saved 17% of their income, but in 2000 the US savings rate hit 0%. Wages will decline in any nation that does not invest in itself. By contrast, consider Germany, which has a high investment rate. Not only does Germany have higher average wages than America, it has also had more economic growth over the last 30 years. And right now China is saving and re-investing 40% of its income. I do not know a single American family that saves 40% of its income. Most of my friends, even those with college educations and good paying jobs, only save 10% or 15% of their income. It is wrong for Americans to first engage in an orgy of over-consumption and under-investment, and then blame poor nations like India and China for the obvious problems that must result from such reckless behavior.

Real entrepreneurs understand that start-ups are insane

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

Penelope Trunk, on the folks who do not understand her, and the entrepreneurs who do:

I’m going to answer the question people ask me most often: “What do I do when my company is out of money?”

Here is the answer:

1. Lay people off to save money
2. Forgo salaries to save money
3. Make a sale to generate money
4. Cut back your family’s spending to redirect money to the company
5. Kill your personal credit to redirect money to the company

All those options suck, of course. I should know. I did them all. And each time I wrote a blog post about how I was going nuts from funding, or making my family crazy from funding, commenters would tell me I look too crazy for anyone to fund.

But entrepreneurs wrote to me to tell me that they understand. Because most entrepreneurs have experienced something similar. They just don’t write about it. And investors are not stupid: They know this is what happens to entrepreneurs. That’s why investors are investors and not entrepreneurs.

Lots of people told me to throw in the towel, but entrepreneurs never did. Because entrepreneurs knows that having a successful startup is really about not quitting. You never get the business model right on the first try. You never feel like you know what you’re doing, and you always have to adjust and adjust until you find what works. If you have passion and energy and faith, you keep going.

But it has to be an insane amount of passion and energy and faith, because there is no sane reason to have a venture backed start-up. A start-up does not get funding if it is a reasonable business model. A start-up gets funded because it’s shooting for the moon, and investors fund companies to have a lottery ticket to the moon. So the odds are terrible that any entrepreneur will succeed. It is always a more sane financial decision to work at a corporate job for a paycheck.

The most misguided defense of the newspapers ever

Wednesday, July 29th, 2009

David Simon writes the single most ludicrous, misguided, uninformed post about the future of the newspapers that I’ve yet seen:

The true audience for this essay narrows necessarily to a pair of notables who have it in their power to save high-end journalism—two newspaper executives who can rescue an imploding industry and thereby achieve an essential civic good for the nation. It’s down to them. The rest of the print journalism world is in slash-and-burn mode, cutting product and then wondering why the product won’t sell, rushing to give away what remains online and wondering further why that content is held by advertisers to be valueless. The mode is full-bore panic. And yet these two individuals, representing as they do the two fundamental institutions that sit astride the profession, still have a card to play, and here’s a shard of good news: it’s the only card that ever really mattered. Arthur Sulzberger Jr. and Katharine Weymouth, publishers of The New York Times and The Washington Post, are at the helms of two organizations trying to find some separate peace with the digital revolution…

Melodramatic. Two brave souls have the power to save the noblest industry on Earth, the 4th estate, they can perform “an essential civic good for the nation”, but only if they act bravely and wisely. It is a good setup for a movie. How is it that Simon got so far out of touch with reality that he doesn’t understand how sentimental and over-heated this is?

Simon is so desperate to save the newspapers, that he wishes they could break the law:

Most of all, I know that here you are being individually asked to consider taking a bold, risk-laden stand for content—that antitrust considerations prohibit the Times and The Post, not to mention Rupert Murdoch or the other owners, from talking this through and acting in concert. Would that every U.S. newspaper publisher could meet in a bathroom somewhere and talk bluntly for fifteen minutes, this would be a hell of a lot easier.

This by itself says a lot about how doomed the newspapers are – that their supporters think the only way to save them is by breaking the law. Having written this paragraph, Simon should then draw the obvious conclusion – that there is no legal way to save the newspapers. But he is deep in denial. He has a strong emotional attachment to the newspapers, so contemplating their demise causes him too much pain – so he escapes into fantasy:

You must act. Together. On a specific date in the near future—let’s say September 1 for the sheer immediacy of it—both news organizations must inform readers that their Web sites will be free to subscribers only, and that while subscription fees can be a fraction of the price of having wood pulp flung on doorsteps, it is nonetheless a requirement for acquiring the contents of the news organizations that spend millions to properly acquire, edit, and present that work.

No half-measures, either. No TimesSelect program that charges for a handful of items and offers the rest for free, no limited availability of certain teaser articles, no bartering with aggregators for a few more crumbs of revenue through microbilling or pennies-on-the-dollar fees.

I’m familiar with “a miracle might happen” reasoning. I went through a lot of this when my father died: “The doctor says there is no hope, but a miracle might happen.” Of course, now, looking back, I can clearly see I was deluding myself. Simon is at an earlier stage. He has not yet started mourning because he believes the thing he loves can still be saved.

He then indulges a fantasy in which he is someday regarded as a hero (I assume he will someday be embarrassed that he wrote this):

And when the Justice Department lawyers arrive, briefcases in hand, to ask why America’s two national newspapers did these things in concert—resulting in a sea change within newspapering as one regional newspaper after another followed suit in pursuit of fresh, lifesaving revenue—you can answer directly: We never talked. Not a word. We read some rant in the Columbia Journalism Review that made the paywall argument. Blame the messenger.

Especially stupid is his dismissal of the idea that online ad revenue will someday be greater than what it is now:

Clearly, the product still moves. But to what purpose, when more and more readers rightly identify the immediate digitized version as superior, yet pay nothing for that version, and online advertising simply doesn’t deliver enough revenue?

He then makes a ludicrous comparison:

For the first thirty years of its existence as America’s primary entertainment medium, television was—after the initial purchase of the set itself—provided at no cost to viewers, instead subsidized by lucrative ad revenues. The notion of Americans in 1975 being asked to pay a monthly bill for their television consumption would have seemed farcical. Yet in the ensuing thirty years, we have become a nation that shells out $60, $70, or $120 in monthly cable fees; indeed, whole vistas of programming exist free of advertising revenue, subsidized entirely by subscriptions.

So, somehow the fact that Americans are willing to pay money to get more content proves that they are willing to pay money to get less content.

Maybe the most funny thing in his whole essay is where he compares the brave, visionary geniuses who run the television industry with the stupid, crass, profit-obessessed buffoons who run the newspaper industry:

But unlike television, in which industry leaders were constantly reinvesting profits in research and development, where a new technology like cable reception would be contemplated for all its potential and opportunity, the newspapering world was content to send its treasure to Wall Street, appeasing analysts and big-ticket shareholders. There was no reinvestment in programming, no intelligent contemplation of new and transformational circulation models, no thought beyond maximized short-term profit.

Oh, those damn newspaper publishers! Always obsessed with short-term profit! Why can’t they be more like the noble, far-seeing statesmen who run the television industry?

But here is the saddest paragraph of all, the one that truly shows how much Simon is gripped by the past, rather than what is to come:

In the newspaper industry, however, the fledgling efforts of new media to replicate the scope, competence, and consistency of a healthy daily paper have so far yielded little in the way of genuine competition. A blog here, a citizen journalist there, a news Web site getting under way in places where the newspaper is diminished—some of it is quite good, but none of it so far begins to achieve consistently what a vibrant newspaper, staffed with competent, paid beat reporters and editors, once offered. New-media entities are not yet able to truly cover—day after day—the society, culture, and politics of cities, states, and nations. And until new models emerge that are capable of paying reporters and editors to do such work—in effect becoming online newspapers with all the gravitas this implies—they are not going to get us anywhere close to professional journalism’s potential.

David Simon will only respect New Media once New Media is able to replicate what Old Media gives us everyday. And here, possibly, is the one and only thing that Simon and I agree on: New Media will never replicate what Old Media gave us.

This is reality: the newspapers will largely die, and nothing is going to take their place. There will be other forms of media in the future, but they won’t look or act like what the newspapers did.

Here is the only passage in the essay where he correctly notes that the newspapers have been dying for a long time, and the Internet is only speeding a long-term, secular trend:

Last, and perhaps most disastrous, the rot began at the bottom and it didn’t reach the highest rungs of the profession until far too much damage had been done. As early as the mid-1980s, the civic indifference and contempt of product inherent in chain ownership was apparent in many smaller American markets. While this was discussed in some circles, usually as a matter of mild rumination, little was done by the industry to address a dynamic by which men in Los Angeles or Chicago or New York, at the behest of Wall Street, determined what sort of journalism would be practiced in Baltimore, Denver, Hartford, or Dallas. If you happened to labor at a newspaper that was ceding its editorial ambition to the price-per-share, it may have been agony, but if you were at the Times, the Post, The Wall Street Journal, or the Los Angeles Times, you were insulated.

I’ve rarely read an essay where the author’s fear of change was so near the surface, so present in every sentence.

There are at least 2 ways to attack Simon’s ideas. One is offered by Brad Delong, who makes the case that the newspapers are often full of lies and misrepresentation, and so he generally finds his favorite blogs more interesting:

I am 6.5 times as likely to be happy that I have spent my time reading one of the top stories in my RSS reader as I am to be happy that I have spent my time reading one of the top stories printed by the New York Times and the Washington Post.

To some degree this is the “Daily Me” phenomenon: my RSS reader is now tuned to bring me things written by people I learn from, while the editors of the Washington Post and the New York Times select stories on the basis of… bizarre and incomprehensible algorithms. To some degree this is because this is because the WP and the NYT are pitched at a level far below the one I want to read at, in part because they think their audience is less clued-in than I am (Peter Baker and Helene Cooper; Dan Balz) and in part because their reporters are out of their depth (i.e., Tobin Harshaw). In part this is because they are unprofessional (i.e., Mark Mazzetti and David Johnston not situating their article in its proper context in the journalistic enterprise begun by The One-Percent Doctrine). To some degree this is because their reporters know nothing about how representative their anecdotes are and so have absolutely nothing interesting to say (Michael Wilson and Solomon Moore; Michael Rosenwald)….

But there is a bigger problem: the army of small start-ups that want a piece of the New York Times’s market. Last year I spent $30,000 to start a new political web site. That is, I spent a small sum, and attracted a small audience. But there are thousands of entrepreneurs like me. Collectively, we spend millions each year, trying to establish sites that can take market share from existing newspapers. And every dollar we spend is a torpedo aimed at the old institutions of media.

In the old days, it took millions of dollars to set up a new newspaper. USA Today took 15 years just to break even. The large scale of the needed capital acted as a barrier to entry, and protected the newspapers from competition. Now a new web site can get going for just $100,000 (I’ve previously written about the costs of websites). Nothing can bring back the old days, when the newspapers could generate high margins, safe behind the barriers that kept competition limited. But David Simon doesn’t see this. Consider the static, unchanging nature of the world in which he thinks he’s living in:

Antitrust considerations prohibit the Times and The Post, not to mention Rupert Murdoch or the other owners, from talking this through and acting in concert

See, in Simon’s world, all of the owners of all of the media companies are known, and could be called together to meet, if only it weren’t for antitrust considerations. What Simon doesn’t see is the vast army of entrepreneurs who are just off-stage, waiting for the right conditions, ready to strike.

My world is very different from Simon’s world. Here’s the world that I live in:

1.) Consumers do not want to pay for online content, so if the newspapers put up pay walls, then entrepreneurs like myself will jump up and down with pure joy, and call in all our favors, to put together the funding for new companies to replace the old newspapers.

2.) However, if a miracle happens, and suddenly consumers are willing to pay for online content, then entrepreneurs like myself will jump up and down with pure joy, and call in all our favors, to put together the funding for new companies to replace the old newspapers.

Either way, more funding will continue to be invested in online media ventures, and the endlessly growing supply will drive down everyone’s margins. More so, we are in for a prolonged period of over-supply, which will drive down everyone’s margins very low, so those businesses that were built around the assumption of healthy margins (and that would include the major newspapers) are going to go bankrupt. A prolonged period of very low margins will mean that only those ventures that are built to survive very low margins will, in fact, survive. And, obviously, the web-based ventures, free of the costs of printing plants and distribution networks, sometimes even free of having an office, can get by on some extremely narrow margins.

There are no scenarios in which the newspapers survive.

Stress can be good

Wednesday, July 15th, 2009

Jason Calacanis on stress:

Stress is a real issue. You can love what you do and have a problem managing the stress. I’ve watched friends work themselves into such anxiety and stress recently that it’s scary. You really need to be a centered person to not internalize the stress that comes from building a startup company. It’s not for everyone, and if you’re going to play in the startup world you have to learn to look at what we do as one giant game.

Some amount of stress is good, because it alerts you to things to focus on. When you’re ridding down the road and a deer jumps in front of your car you feel stress. Hopefully that stress makes you take action. The key is to be able to calm yourself down after the near miss and keep driving down the road.

Now, when I was a younger entrepreneur I would sweat it, but now that I’m older I really don’t get stressed out. It’s not that I don’t care about the things that cause stress, I do. I just don’t let that stress internalize. If a deer jumps out in front of me I respond quickly, but my heart doesn’t jump out of chest for two hours like it used to.

The people who don’t feel stress are the ones who look at things with perspective: Our lives in technology industry are really easy. We’re blessed to play in such a dynamic space that is, at the end of the day, one big fun research project. It’s a big, fun game we’re all in here–nothing more. Don’t take it so serious… play hard and enjoy it!

We get to build huge products that can become big businesses. If they don’t, you can just move on and do it again. Let’s face it, very few people have it as good as us in the technology industry.

For startups, careful study is better than a unique, creative idea

Sunday, February 1st, 2009

I’m collecting notes for the next time I go to talk to a new client. Here are some articles I just stumbled across, that I like.

Here,  Amar BhidÉ criticizes the importance given to unique, creative ideas:

Inc.: Well, then, let’s start with the notion of no proprietary idea, no novel product or service to offer, which will come as a surprise to many people. How do these promising businesses get started?

BhidÉ: Most are started by someone who is working for another business, who sees a small niche opportunity — one in which the company he or she is working for is already taking advantage of, or one in which a supplier or customer is involved. And the person jumps in with very little preparation and analysis but with direct firsthand knowledge of the profitability of that opportunity — and pretty much does what somebody else is already doing, but does it better and faster. These entrepreneurs don’t have anything that differentiates their business from other businesses in terms of technology or in terms of a concept. They just work harder, hustle for customers, and know that the opportunity may not last for more than six or eight months. But they expect to make a reasonable return on those six to eight months. And along the way they’ll figure out something else that will keep the business going.

Inc.: The idea that you build a company around novelty — around a unique proprietary idea — is very ingrained in our culture.

BhidÉ: You’re right. All my students, when they think of how they’re going to start a business, want to start with a clever idea. I have very few students who come to me and say, “I want to start a business — I see X do this, and he’s incredibly profitable. I want to do the same thing.” That’s not the way people seem to think. Yet that’s the way most successful entrepreneurs start up. They make a small modification in what somebody else is doing.

And Adam Hanft celebrates strategic thinking and clinical logic:

While we’re desperately looking for the totally radical, unique, one-of-a-kind solution, the vast majority of marketing — or even business — problems can be solved by the lapidary application of disciplined strategic thinking, scenario-building, and clinical logic. Take the creation of 2004’s most successful consumer product, the lifestyle-reshaping iPod. As revolutionary as it was, every building block — product design, music provisioning, marketing — was an incremental step versus a barrier-busting leap: the application of a memory-storage capability; the cool, sleek, white and chrome aesthetic; the user-friendly selection wheel; the decision to sell 99 cent songs as opposed to the subscription model; getting U2 to lend their name to a specific model.

None-of-these decisions, by themselves, was astoundingly provocative. The integration and synthesis of all of them, however, was just that. That was the difficult, practical hard part. Which is a good reminder that it’s often easier to think out of the box, than in it. But only a real grown-up knows that.

Using language that I’m not entirely comfortable with, Adam Hanft emphasizes the need to describe yourself in unique terms:

Very few companies — large or small — have a powerful voice, or think about the need to find and sustain one. Most companies, the vast majority, in fact, describe themselves in automated, commodity language that’s fully interchangeable. And critically, the way you describe yourself is the way you think about yourself. And that influences behavior.

I spent some time checking out the websites of the Inc. 500 companies, and the language they use is generic mush, the worst kind of corporate writing, as flaccid and ignorable as the blenderized boredom manufactured by the hotel lobby pianist. There’s a void of voicelessness out there.

I’m not saying they’re not temporarily successful. Clearly, they are. But I would submit that if they articulated the reasons for this success with a unique corporate voice, their market position would be far stronger and more durable.

The part I like most is “And critically, the way you describe yourself is the way you think about yourself. And that influences behavior.” And I agree that most companies use the worst kind of generic language when describing themselves. I recall when we were working at Bluewall, I was inspired by Clay Shirky’s essay Ontology is Overrated, and created a website that allowed people to post links and tag them. We then tried to come up with a name. The owner and I thought of names like “Tag cloud” and “Tag list” and “Tag castle”. Darren Hoyt made the point that a generic name suggested generic thinking.  He himself suggested “Accumulist” which was quite an improvement.

Mistakes that startups make

Wednesday, November 19th, 2008

This is a great post:

“17 mistakes start-ups make” in 100 words.

  • Failing to spend enough time researching the business idea to see if it’s viable.
  • Miscalculating market size. Entrepreneurs say, ‘The market size is 50 million people. If I only sell to 2 percent, I’d be selling a million.’ But most products sell less than 1 percent.
  • Making a commitment on sales projections that were wrong. Created costs that require those projections to be met. Run out of money.
  • Overprojecting sales prospects.
  • Making cost projections that are too low.
  • Hiring too many people and spending too much.
  • Lacking a contingency plans.
  • Bringing in unnecessary partners.
  • Hiring for convenience rather than skill requirements.
  • Spending half their time doing something that represents 5 percent of their business.
  • Accepting that it’s “not possible” too easily.
  • Focusing too much on volume and company size rather than profit.
  • Looking for somebody to tell you you’re right.
  • Lacking simplicity.
  • Lacking clarity of your long-term aim and business purpose.
  • Going after too many targets at once.
  • Lacking an exit strategy.